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For as long as marriage has existed in the United States, divorce has been its necessary opposite. So strong is
the need for divorce that the Supreme Court has suggested it is a fundamental right, and every state in the
country allows access to no-fault divorce. For opposite-sex couples, legally ending their marriage is possible as
a matter of right. For married same-sex couples, however, state DoMAs (Defense of Marriage Acts) have been
a stumbling block – preventing access to divorce in some states. Same-sex couples in numerous states are
being told by attorneys and judges that they cannot terminate their legal marriage. In a word, these couples are
wedlocked.
This article proceeds in three parts. Part I will address the question: “Who needs divorce?” The answer:
Everyone who is in a legal marriage in which they no longer wish to remain a party. Part I of this article
discusses the importance of divorce to married couples who no longer share their lives, and sets out the array
of intractable issues that arise when a couple – whether opposite-sex or same-sex – is unable to end a marriage.
Part II addresses the question: “Do courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over same-sex divorce?” The
answer: Yes. In the vast majority of states, nothing has stripped state courts of general jurisdiction of the power
to exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over a same-sex divorce. Part III addresses the question: “Can a court
grant a same-sex divorce?” The answer: Yes. Again, the vast majority of state DoMAs neither explicitly nor
implicitly prevents a court from granting a divorce to same-sex couples. Part IV takes on the question: “How
can a same-sex couple get a divorce?” This Part explains how a court can grant a same-sex divorce by applying
the residency state’s divorce statute, the divorce statute of the marrying state, or by granting equitable relief.
Finally, Part V asks the question: “Are courts required to grant same-sex divorce?” The answer: Yes. Part V
asserts that denying same-sex couples access to divorce violates due process and equal protection. These
constitutional provisions require states to provide access to divorce to same-sex couples to prevent them from
remaining wedlocked.
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I. INTRODUCTION
For as long as marriage has existed in the United States, divorce
has been its necessary opposite.1 So strong is the need for divorce that
every state in the country allows access to no-fault divorce,2 and the
Supreme Court has suggested it is a fundamental right.3 For opposite-sex
couples, legally ending their marriage is possible as a matter of right.
For married same-sex couples, however, state Defense of Marriage Acts
(“DoMAs”)4 have been a stumbling block. Same-sex couples residing in
1. GLENDA RILEY, DIVORCE: AN AMERICAN TRADITION 3 (1991) (“Puritan settlers first
introduced [divorce] in the American colonies during the early 1600s.”); Lawrence M. Friedman,
A Dead Language: Divorce Law and Practice Before No-Fault, 86 VA. L. REV. 1497, 1501
(2000) (“Judicial divorce was almost universal [within the United States] by 1900 . . . .”) (footnote
omitted)).
2. Lawrence M. Friedman, Rights of Passage: Divorce Law in Historical Perspective, 63
OR. L. REV. 649, 664 (1984). California instituted the first no-fault divorce regime in 1970. Id. at
667. Since 1985, all states but Arkansas have offered at least some form of no-fault divorce.
Developments in the Law—The Law of Marriage and Family, v. Marriage As Contract and
Marriage As Partnership: The Future of Antenuptial Agreement Law, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2075,
2089 (2003). Arkansas has offered no-fault divorce since 1991. Denese Ashbaugh Vlosky &
Pamela A. Monroe, The Effective Dates of No-Fault Divorce Laws in the 50 States, 51 FAM. REL.
317, 323 (2002).
3. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971) (“[D]ue process does prohibit a State
from denying, solely because of inability to pay, access to its courts to individuals who seek
judicial dissolution of their marriages.”).
4. The majority of state DoMA provisions were passed in the mid-1990s to early 2000s
following the passage of the federal DoMA in 1996. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006); Virgina F.
Coleman, Same-Sex Marriage, SR013 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 467, 512 (2009) (listing the passage years of
state statutory and constitutional DoMA provisions as of 2009). See generally Mary Patricia Byrn
& Morgan L. Holcomb, Same-Sex Divorce in a DoMA State, 50 FAM. CT. REV. 214 (2012).
Relevant to this Article, the federal DoMA provides that no state “shall be required to give effect”
to same-sex marriages performed in other states. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C. One federal district court
described this section of DoMA as follows: “Congress permitted the states to decline to give effect
to the laws of other states respecting same-sex marriage. In so doing, Congress relied on its
‘express grant of authority,’ under . . . the Constitution’s Full Faith and Credit Clause . . . .” Gill v.
Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 378 (D. Mass. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Mass. v. U.S.
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). There is a
vigorous debate about the constitutionality of DoMA. See, e.g., ALISON M. SMITH, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RL 31994, SAME-SEX MARRIAGES: LEGAL ISSUES 4–9 (2012), available at http:/
/www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL31994.pdf (reviewing the various constitutional challenges to
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numerous DoMA states have been told by courts that because their state
DoMA renders their marriages void, they cannot terminate their legal
marriages.5 In a word, these couples are wedlocked.
The cost of being wedlocked might not be self-evident. After all,
what is the harm in being trapped in a void marriage? As it turns out, the
harms can be significant.6 A same-sex couple validly married in one
jurisdiction remains in that valid marriage despite the fact that the
DoMA in federal courts); Adam Liptak, A Tipping Point for Gay Marriage?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30,
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/01/weekinreview/01gay.html?pagewanted=all (describing
the public debate surrounding same-sex marriage and DoMA). An equally vigorous debate
surrounds whether, absent § 2 of the federal DoMA, states would be obliged to recognize same-
sex marriages from other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Mark Strasser, Life After DOMA, 17 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POL’Y 399, 399–400 (2010) (“[O]n some interpretations of DOMA, the repeal or
invalidation of the Act will have little or no effect on the power of states to refuse to recognize
same-sex marriages validly celebrated elsewhere, although on other interpretations the repeal or
invalidation of DOMA would have important effects.”). Because we argue a state need not
recognize an out-of-state same-sex marriage in order to grant divorce, a discussion of why state
DoMAs fail to establish a valid exception to the general principle that a marriage valid in the place
of celebration is valid everywhere—otherwise known as the principle of comity—is outside the
scope of this Article. See generally Brief of Sha’rron Ameedah Saleem in Opposition to the
Maryland State’s Attorney’s Motion to Compel Testimony at 9–16, State v. Snowden, No. 21-K-
11-45589 (Md. Cir. Ct. June 15, 2011) (outlining the argument that state DoMAs fail to establish a
valid exception to comity, the historical roots of comity, and full faith and credit in the context of
same-sex marriage recognition); Marriage—Whether Out-of-State Same-Sex Marriage that is
Valid in the State of Celebration May Be Recognized in Maryland, 95 Md. Op. Att’y Gen. 3, 3–4
(2010) (discussing how the state of Maryland may recognize marriages of same-sex couples
validly married in another state).
5. Several cases have denied divorce to same-sex couples. See, e.g., Rosengarten v. Downes,
802 A.2d 170, 172 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002); Lane v. Albanese, No. FA044002128S, 2005 WL
896129, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 18, 2005); In re Marriage of Ranzy, No. 49D12-0903-DR-
014654, slip op. at 3 (Ind. Super. Ct. Sep. 4, 2009); Mueller v. Pry, No. CI10-237, slip op. at 2
(Neb. Dist. Ct. Jan. 25, 2011); B.S. v. F.B., 883 N.Y.S.2d 458, 466–67 (Sup. Ct. 2009); Gonzalez
v. Green, 831 N.Y.S.2d 856, 858–59 (Sup. Ct. 2006); Irwin v. Lupardus, No. 41379, 1980 WL
355015, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. June 26, 1980); Kern v. Taney, 11 Pa. D. & C. 5th 558, 562–63 (Ct.
Com. Pl. 2010); Chambers v. Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956, 967 (R.I. 2007); In re Marriage of J.B. &
H.B., 326 S.W.3d 654, 659 (Tex. App. 2010). There are, however, other decisions that have
granted relief to same-sex couples seeking divorce. See In re Marriage of Brown & Perez, No.
CDCD 119660, slip op. at 1–2 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Dec. 24, 2003); Port v. Cowan, 44 A.3d 970 (Md.
2012); Salucco v. Alldredge, No. 02E0087GC1, 2004 WL 864459, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar.
19, 2004); Glaser v. Grassman, No. 27-CV-10-16600, at 3–4 (Minn. Dist. Ct. July 22, 2010);
Hammond v. Hammond, No. FM-11-905-08B, slip op. at 2 (N.J. Super. Ct. Div. Ch. Feb. 6,
2009); Carrejo v. Haught, No. D-0101-DM-2009-0504, slip op. at 2 (N.M. Dist. Ct. Oct. 12,
2010); Dickerson v. Thompson, 897 N.Y.S.2d 298, 301 (App. Div. 2010); Parker v. Waronker,
918 N.Y.S.2d 822, 824–25 (Sup. Ct. 2010); Beth R. v. Donna M., 853 N.Y.S.2d 501, 506 (Sup.
Ct. 2008); C.M. v. C.C., 867 N.Y.S.2d 884, 889 (Sup. Ct. 2008); State v. Naylor, 330 S.W.3d 434,
442–43 (Tex. App. 2011) (denying Texas’ motion to intervene after the trial court entered a final
divorce decree for a same-sex couple); Gill v. Adkins, No. 09-3-01572-1, slip op. at ¶ 3.1 (Wash.
Super. Ct. Feb. 5, 2010); In re Marriage of Gorman & Gump, No. 02-D-292, slip op. ¶ 1 (W. Va.
Fam. Ct. Dec. 19, 2002); Christiansen v. Christiansen, 253 P.3d 153, 156–57 (Wyo. 2011).
6. See Courtney G. Joslin, Modernizing Divorce Jurisdiction: Same-Sex Couples and
Minimum Contacts, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1669, 1683–89 (2011) (discussing the harms of denying
divorce to same-sex couples).
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couple, or a member of the couple, resides in a jurisdiction that does not
recognize their marriage. The couple’s legal union will be recognized by
the growing number of jurisdictions that recognize same-sex unions.7 As
a result, if a member of the couple moves to, or even travels through a
recognizing state, the individual will be considered married in that state.
Likewise, if the non-recognizing state where the couple resides changes
its policy and becomes a recognizing state, suddenly the couple—previ-
ously unable to get a divorce because the marriage was void—will be
married.
Married couples seek divorce for a myriad of reasons. Those rea-
sons include the pragmatic—such as distribution of property, assign-
ment of spousal support, and division of debt,8 and the emotional—such
as finality and repose.9 Married couples also seek divorce knowing that
without a divorce decree neither partner can remarry.10 This last reason
7. As of September 14, 2012 the following jurisdictions permit either same-sex marriage or
same-sex civil unions: Massachusetts, Connecticut, Iowa, Vermont, New Hampshire, New York,
the District of Columbia, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, New Jersey, and Rhode Island. See Where
State Laws Stand, FREEDOM TO MARRY, http://www.freedomtomarry.org/pages/where-state-laws-
stand (last visited Sept. 14, 2012). Maryland and New Mexico explicitly recognize out-of-state
same-sex marriages and civil unions. Id.
8. Although technically divorce does not dissolve preexisting debtor obligations, courts
routinely divide or assign debts upon divorce. See Jill C. Rush, Comment, Unequal Treatment and
Creditor Frustrations: The Limited Impact of Legalizing Same Sex Marriage, 21 EMORY BANKR.
DEV. J. 743, 749 (2005). A creditor may still use any remedies it had before the divorce to recover
from either liable spouse, but “under the held-harmless doctrine, the spouse who does not claim
responsibility is held harmless by the court.” Id. at 750 (footnote omitted). On the flip side,
divorce ensures that future good fortune will not inure to the benefit of the ex-spouse. This
possibility is not simply the musing of underworked academics. In a well-known Illinois case, an
opposite-sex couple dissolved their relationship but did not obtain a judicial divorce. In re
Marriage of Morris, 640 N.E.2d 344, 346 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994), cited in Colleen McNichols
Ramais, Note, ‘Til Death Do You Part . . . and This Time We Mean It: Denial of Access to
Divorce for Same-Sex Couples, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1013, 1036 n.169. Over a decade later, one
member of the couple won the lottery, and the other member of the couple successfully sued for a
portion of the winnings. In re Marriage of Morris, 640 N.E.2d at 347. We also include inheritance
in this pragmatic column. Nearly every state has enacted laws that prohibit spouses from
disinheriting each other. See Terry L. Turnipseed, Why Shouldn’t I Be Allowed to Leave My
Property to Whomever I Choose at My Death? (Or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Start
Loving the French), 44 BRANDEIS L.J. 737, 739 (2006) (“[F]orty-nine of the fifty states and the
District of Columbia severely limit freedom of testation vis-à-vis surviving spouses.” (footnote
omitted)). Ex-spouses typically have no such obligation. See e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.2-301
(2012) (noting entitlement of surviving spouse, but not mentioning ex-spouse); Ralph C. Brashier,
Disinheritance and the Modern Family, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 83, 99-102 (1994) (omitting
any discussion of obligations to ex-spouses).
9. This repose is especially pressing for members of abusive relationships. Jennifer L.
Vainik, Note, Kiss, Kiss, Bang, Bang: How Current Approaches to Guns and Domestic Violence
Fail to Save Women’s Lives, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1113, 1128 (2007). Although “research on lesbian
and gay domestic violence has been limited and conflicting” there is no question that domestic
violence exists in same-sex relationships. KATHARINE T. BARTLETT & DEBORAH L. RHODE,
GENDER AND THE LAW: THEORY, DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY 477 (4th ed. 2006).
10. Without a divorce decree the remarrying partner could not certify honestly that he is not
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is likely the most important because, although couples can sometimes
handle the pragmatic and emotional issues surrounding the end of mar-
riage on their own, there is no way couples can legally divorce—thereby
allowing the individuals to remarry—absent judicial intervention.11 As
the Supreme Court counsels, “we know of no instance where two con-
senting adults may divorce and mutually liberate themselves from the
constraints of legal obligations that go with marriage . . . without invok-
ing the State’s judicial machinery.”12 It is for these reasons that married
same-sex couples, regardless of the state in which they live, need access
to divorce.
Indeed, married same-sex couples in states that do not recognize
same-sex unions understand the importance of divorce and have sought
it out. Too many courts, however, have refused to allow access to
divorce, basing that refusal on two related but distinct rationales. Some
courts have asserted that they do not have subject-matter jurisdiction
over same-sex divorce,13 while other courts have maintained that same-
sex divorce is not a claim for which relief can be granted.14 Both of
these conclusions, however, are wrong. Assertions regarding lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction over same-sex divorce have been justified by
misguided readings of state DoMAs and misunderstandings of state
court jurisdiction. Similarly, the conclusion that courts cannot provide
relief to same-sex couples seeking divorce is based on misinterpretations
currently married on her new marriage application. See, e.g., Application to Marry in Iowa, IOWA
DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH, available at http://www.polkrecorder.com/marriageappnew.pdf (requiring
applicants to certify they are “both unmarried”). If he were to remarry, his subsequent marriage
would be considered void ab initio. See, e.g., Elia-Warnken v. Elia, 972 N.E.2d 17 (Mass. 2012)
(declaring a Massachusetts marriage void ab initio under the state’s polygamy laws because one of
the parties to the marriage had not validly dissolved his prior Vermont civil union). He could also
be tried as a bigamist, IOWA CODE § 726.1 (2011) (defining bigamy, a serious misdemeanor, as
“[a]ny person, having a living husband or wife, who marries another . . . ”).
11. See, e.g., Brian H. Bix, Private Ordering and Family Law, 23 J. AM. ACAD.
MATRIMONIAL LAW. 249, 249–250 (2010) (“American states increasingly allow[ ] different types
of private ordering in a range of different family law areas . . . [w]ithin quite broad limits,
consenting adults can act and interact as much as they please in domestic matters; it is only when
they seek recognition by the state of their arrangements or enforcement of their commitments that
the issue of ‘private ordering’ arises.”).
12. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376 (1971).
13. See, e.g., Lane v. Albanese, No. FA044002128S, 2005 WL 896129, at *4 (Conn. Super.
Ct. Mar. 18, 2005) (“[T]his court has no choice but to dismiss this case for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.”); In re Marriage of Ranzy, No. 49D12-0903-DR-014654, slip op. at ¶ 20 (Ind. Super.
Ct. Sep. 4, 2009) (“The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and cannot grant the petition for
dissolution.”).
14. See e.g., Gonzalez v. Green, 831 N.Y.S.2d 856, 859 (Sup. Ct. 2006) (although New York
did not have a state DoMA, the judge dismissed the claim for divorce on the grounds that the
Massachusetts marriage was void and plaintiff failed to state a claim for which relief could be
granted). See also e.g., Irwin v. Lupardus, No. 41379, 1980 WL 355015, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App.
June 26, 1980).
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of the requirements of state DoMAs. Moreover, refusing to allow same-
sex couples to divorce violates long-standing principles of equity and
violates rights guaranteed by the federal Constitution.
Part II of this Article begins by untangling the muddle state courts
have made of jurisdiction in same-sex divorce cases. We explain how, in
the vast majority of states, state courts of general jurisdiction have the
power to exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over same-sex divorce.
With that settled, we proceed in Part III to explain that, with only one
exception, state DoMAs neither explicitly nor implicitly prevent a court
from granting relief to same-sex couples seeking divorce. Part IV then
offers a practical guide to obtaining such relief—explaining how a court
can grant a same-sex divorce by applying either the residency state’s
divorce statute, the divorce statute of the marrying state, or by granting
equitable relief. Finally, Part V demonstrates that denying access to
divorce to same-sex couples is constitutionally suspect. We describe
how three interlocking constitutional rights—the right to access the
courts, the right to divorce, and the right to remarry—converge at the
exact moment of same-sex divorce. We describe how these constitu-
tional rights interact to ensure that all individuals in a legal marriage,
whether or not that marriage is recognized by their state of residence,
must have access to legal divorce.
II. STATE DOMAS DO NOT PROHIBIT STATE COURTS FROM
EXERCISING SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION OVER
SAME-SEX DIVORCE
To grant a divorce, a court must possess and exercise two distinct
powers: the court must have the power to hear the case, typically
referred to as subject-matter jurisdiction, and the court must have the
power to render a judgment on the merits, often referred to as the power
to grant relief.15 Most state courts that have denied petitions for same-
sex divorce have dismissed the cases for lack of subject-matter jurisdic-
tion.16 A finding that a state court does not have subject-matter jurisdic-
tion over divorce has significant consequences. If a court does not have
15. Robert E. Oliphant, Jurisdiction in Family Law Matters: The Minnesota Perspective, 30
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 557, 559–60 (2003); Lacks v. Lacks, 359 N.E.2d 384, 388 (N.Y. 1976)
(“[T]he overly stated principle that lack of subject matter jurisdiction makes a final judgment
absolutely void is not applicable to cases which, upon analysis, do not involve jurisdiction, but
merely substantive elements of a cause for relief. To do so would be to undermine significantly
the doctrine of res judicata, and to eliminate the certainty and finality in the law and in litigation
which the doctrine is designed to protect.”). See also In re Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 412
A.2d 1099, 1102 (Pa. 1980) (“The question is whether the court has power to enter into the
inquiry and not whether it is able to grant the relief sought in the particular case.” (quoting
Cooper-Bessemer Co. v. Ambrosia Coal & Constr. Co., 291 A.2d 99, 100 (1972))).
16. E.g., Rosengarten v. Downes, 802 A.2d 170, 184 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002); Lane, 2005 WL
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subject-matter jurisdiction, any judgment it renders on the merits is
void17 and may be collaterally attacked.18 Furthermore, a court must sua
sponte dismiss the case if it determines that it does not have subject-
matter jurisdiction.19
The severe consequences that flow from a lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction counsel courts to distinguish carefully between dismissals
premised on subject-matter jurisdiction and dismissals based on other
grounds. It is crucial for courts to speak clearly and carefully about the
rationale for their dismissals because if a court does not have subject-
matter jurisdiction “it can do nothing ‘in any cause’ at all.”20 On the
other hand, “good jurisdiction [is] the ticket to a broad and flexible . . .
judicial power: a party who clear[s] the jurisdictional hurdle w[ill]
‘fin[d] a court clothed with entire power to do justice according to law,
or according to equity . . . .’”21
896129, at *4; In re Marriage of Ranzy, No. 49D12-0903-DR-014654, slip op. at ¶ 20; In re
Marriage of J.B. & H.B., 326 S.W.3d 654, 659 (Tex. App. 2010).
17. E.g., In re Estate of Falck, 672 N.W.2d 785, 789 (Iowa 2003) (“If a court enters a
judgment without jurisdiction over the subject matter, the judgment is void.” (citing Crawley v.
Gardiner (In re Adoption of Gardiner), 287 N.W.2d 555, 559 (Iowa 1980))); Matson v. Matson,
310 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 1981) (“A void judgment is one rendered in the absence of
jurisdiction over the subject matter or the parties.” (citing Lange v. Johnson, 204 N.W.2d 205, 208
(Minn. 1973))); Editorial Photocolor Archives, Inc. v. Granger Collection, 463 N.E.2d 365, 368
(N.Y. 1984) (“A judgment or order issued without subject-matter jurisdiction is void . . . .”); In re
United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 307 S.W.3d 299, 309–10 (Tex. 2010) (“A judgment is void if rendered
by a court without subject matter jurisdiction.” (citing Mapco, Inc. v. Forrest, 795 S.W.2d 700,
703 (Tex. 1990))).
18. Carter v. Carter, 307 P.2d 630, 633 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957) (“[A] void order or judgment is
subject to collateral attack at any time and in any place by any interested party.”); Hauser v.
Mealey, 263 N.W.2d 803, 808 (Minn. 1978) (“[I]t is the general rule that a judgment rendered by
a court which lacks jurisdiction to hear a case does not have the effect of res judicata.” (citing
Muellenberg v. Joblinski, 247 N.W. 570, 572 (Minn. 1933))); Booth v. McKnight, 70 P.3d 855,
859–60 & n.22 (Okla. 2003) (noting that when the record reveals a lack of jurisdiction, a probate
“decree is facially void and subject to collateral attack by any interested party at any time and
wherever venue may be laid”); Lawrence Sys., Inc. v. Superior Feeders, Inc., 880 S.W.2d 203,
212 (Tex. App. 1994) (“[A] null judgment has no legal effect and will not support a res judicata
plea.” (citing City of Lufkin v. McVicker, 510 S.W.2d 141, 144 (Tex. App. 1973))).
19. E.g., Lloyd v. State, 251 N.W.2d 551, 558 (Iowa 1977) (“If the court has no subject
matter jurisdiction it has no power to enter a judgment on the merits and must dismiss the
action.”); Moses v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 12 S.W.3d 168, 170, 172 (Tex. App. 2000)
(dismissing for want of jurisdiction and holding that “the trial court’s lack of subject matter
jurisdiction is fundamental error that [the appellate court] may raise sua sponte because [appellate]
jurisdiction over the merits of a case is no greater than that of the court from which the appeal is
taken” (citing Dallas Cnty. Appraisal Dist. v. Funds Recovery, Inc., 887 S.W.2d 465, 468 (Tex.
App. 1994))); see also, e.g., MINN. R. CIV. P. 12.08(c) (“Whenever it appears by suggestion of the
parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss
the action.”).
20. Frederic M. Bloom, Jurisdiction’s Noble Lie, 61 STAN. L. REV. 971, 977 (2009) (quoting
Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868)).
21. Laura S. Fitzgerald, Is Jurisdiction Jurisdictional?, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1207, 1216 (2001)
(emphasis omitted) (quoting BENJAMIN ROBBINS CURTIS, JURISDICTION, PRACTICE, AND PECULIAR
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Unfortunately, several courts dismissing same-sex divorce petitions
for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction have done so without such a care-
ful analysis. These courts have based their dismissals on three different
and inaccurate conclusions regarding subject-matter jurisdiction. Some
courts assert that their state DoMA strips them of subject-matter juris-
diction over same-sex divorce.22 Other courts assert that they lack juris-
diction because their state divorce statute does not provide for same-sex
divorce.23 Finally, one state supreme court has held that because its state
family courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, same-sex couples have
no avenue for relief in the couple’s state of residence.24 These courts are
mistaken. Under a proper analysis, state courts do have subject-matter
jurisdiction over same-sex divorce petitions.
A. State DoMAs Do Not Strip Courts of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
over Same-Sex Divorce Cases
The dismissals described above are confounding because most state
courts are courts of general jurisdiction with broad jurisdiction to hear
any justiciable dispute.25 One exception is when jurisdiction over a par-
ticular dispute is placed with some other tribunal.26 In these instances,
jurisdiction over the dispute does not disappear from the state. Instead,
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES 129 (Henry Childs Merwin ed., 2d ed.
1896)).
22. E.g., In re Marriage of J.B. & H.B., 326 S.W.3d 654, 664–67, 670 (Tex. App. 2010)
(overruling the trial court’s determination that it had subject-matter jurisdiction despite
acknowledging that Texas’s trial courts are courts of general jurisdiction and reasoning that
Texas’s DoMA stripped subject-matter jurisdiction). See also, e.g., Rosengarten v. Downes, 802
A.2d 170, 182 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002); Mueller v. Pry, No. CI10-237, slip op. at 2 (Neb. Dist. Ct.
Jan. 25, 2011); Kern v. Taney, 11 Pa. D. & C. 5th 558, 576 (Ct. Comm. Pl. 2010). In other
instances, confusion results when courts merely sidle up to the jurisdiction issue, as the Oklahoma
court of appeals did in O’Darling v. O’Darling, No. 106,732, slip op. at 9–10 (Okla. Civ. App.
Mar. 11, 2010). In O’Darling, the court refused to decide whether Oklahoma courts have subject-
matter jurisdiction over same-sex divorce and instead decided the case on an evidentiary basis. Id.
23. E.g., Christiansen v. Christiansen, No. 2010-266, slip op. at ¶¶ 6, 14–15 (Wyo. Dist. Ct.
Nov. 8, 2010), rev’d, 253 P.3d 153 (Wyo. 2011) (quoting WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-101(2012)).
24. Chambers v. Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956, 967 (R.I. 2007) (“We conclude that the word
‘marriage’ in . . . the statute . . . was not intended by the General Assembly to empower the
Family Court to hear and determine petitions for divorce involving . . . ‘two persons of the same
sex who were purportedly married in another state.’” (citing R.I. State Labor Relations Bd. v.
Valley Falls Fire Dist., 505 A.2d 1170, 1171 (R.I. 1986))).
25. Indeed, one commentator noted that “state common law courts do tend to hear an array of
questions that would be nonjusticiable under federal law.” Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the
“Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1863 (2001)
(footnote omitted). Hershkoff, in particular, invites us to study the willingness of state courts to
adjudicate widely in order to “question conventional assumptions about judicial capacity and the
idea that there are inherent limits to adjudication.” Id. at 1841.
26. Some states have created tribunals with limited jurisdiction, such as conciliation courts or
state tax courts. See, e.g., Chambers, 935 A.2d at 958 (noting that the Rhode Island Family Court
is a “legislatively created court of limited jurisdiction”) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)).
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jurisdiction is simply placed in a separate, specialized court that is
intended to better address such disputes. No state has placed same-sex
divorce in a specialized tribunal. As such, state trial courts are presumed
to have subject-matter jurisdiction over same-sex divorce petitions.27
Curiously, however, some state courts have been unwilling to recognize
their broad jurisdiction and have asserted that state DoMAs strip them of
jurisdiction over same-sex divorce.28 In all but one state, this assertion is
incorrect.
Georgia is the only state in which its state DoMA strips the trial
courts of jurisdiction over same-sex divorce because Georgia’s is the
only state DoMA that mentions divorce. Georgia’s lengthy constitu-
tional DoMA provides, inter alia, that “[t]he courts of this state shall
have no jurisdiction to grant a divorce or separate maintenance with
respect to any [same-sex] relationship . . . .”29 Assuming for the moment
that this removal of jurisdiction is constitutional,30 Georgia is the only
state whose courts can correctly assert that they do not have jurisdiction
over same-sex divorce. No other state has stripped its courts of jurisdic-
tion over same-sex divorce through its DoMA, and, absent such
extraordinary language as that found in Georgia’s DoMA, there is no
reason to presume that state courts do not retain jurisdiction over same-
sex divorce.
When state legislatures intend to constrict the jurisdiction of their
state’s courts, they do so explicitly. Georgia did so for same-sex divorce,
and other states have done so in other domestic contexts. Minnesota’s
co-habitation statute provides one such example. That statute explicitly
provides that “[u]nless the individuals have executed a contract . . . the
courts of this state are without jurisdiction to hear . . . any claim . . .
based on the fact that the individuals lived together in contemplation of
sexual relations and out of wedlock . . . .”31 This statute, like Georgia’s
27. See, e.g., C.M. v. C.C., 867 N.Y.S.2d 884, 888 (Sup. Ct. 2008) (“The Supreme Court in
New York is a court of general jurisdiction and has the power to grant a [same-sex] divorce even
if the marriage could not lawfully occur in this State.”).
28. E.g., In re Marriage of J.B. & H.B., 326 S.W.3d 654, 664–67, 670 (Tex. App. 2010)
(holding that because Texas statutes declare same-sex marriages to be void, the court could not
give legal effect to the marriage by granting a divorce, and thus the Texas statutes deprived the
courts of statutory jurisdiction over a divorce petition of a same-sex couple).
29. GA. CONST. art. I, § 4, para. 1(b).
30. It would be an extraordinary undermining of judicial power and inconsistent with
traditional notions of separation of powers to permit the entirety of a state court’s subject-matter
jurisdiction to be subject to the whim of a legislative majority. Separately, Part V establishes that
access to divorce for same-sex couples is a federal constitutional guarantee that requires the
portion of the Georgia law denying divorce to yield to the supremacy of federal law. See U.S.
CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; infra Part V.A–B.
31. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 513.076 (West 2012) (emphasis added). Minnesota permits opposite-
sex, unmarried cohabitants to enter into contracts concerning their joint property and financial
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DoMA, explicitly strips courts of jurisdiction in certain instances, show-
ing that state legislatures are perfectly able to explicitly convey their
intent to limit a court’s jurisdiction in the domestic relations arena. Fur-
thermore, Georgia enacted its DoMA statute, which explicitly prohibits
its courts from granting same-sex divorce, in 1996.32 It is assumed that
legislatures enacting DoMAs after 1996 knew of the express language in
Georgia’s DoMA. Therefore, according to the cannon of statutory inter-
pretation expressio unius est exclusio alterius,33 the exclusion of explicit
divorce language in any DoMA enacted after 1996 can be seen as inten-
tional. Forty-nine states have chosen not to include language that strips
their state courts of jurisdiction over same-sex divorce. This legislative
silence is deafening.
When a state’s DoMA does not explicitly modify the jurisdiction of
the trial courts, state courts should not engage in judicial activism by
reading such a jurisdiction-stripping element into their state’s DoMA.
State courts favor interpreting state statutes as leaving general jurisdic-
tion unaltered unless it is clear that the legislature intended a change.34
Reading DoMAs as jurisdiction-stripping violates this established canon
of statutory interpretation. A Texas appellate court provides an example
of just such overreaching. In In re Marriage of J.B. & H.B., a Texas
appellate court interpreted Texas’s DoMA as stripping subject-matter
jurisdiction over same-sex divorce.35 Texas’s DoMA provides that mar-
riage is a union between a man and a woman and that no effect may be
given to:
(1) [a] public act, record, or judicial proceeding that creates, recog-
nizes, or validates a marriage between persons of the same sex or a
civil union in this state or in any other jurisdiction; or (2) [a] right or
claim to any legal protection, benefit, or responsibility asserted as a
result of a marriage between persons of the same sex or a civil union
in this state or in any other jurisdiction.36
If the J.B. court’s reading of Texas’s DoMA as jurisdiction-stripping
relations in contemplation of a sexual relationship, but the state will enforce the contract only if
the contract is written and signed and if its enforcement is sought after the relationship is
terminated. Id. § 513.075.
32. GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-3.1(b) (2010).
33. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 661 (9th ed. 2009) (“[T]o express or include one thing
implies the exclusion of the other, or of the alternative.”).
34. When a state’s legislature intends to strip jurisdiction from the court, courts require the
legislature to do so in very plain language. When a statute imposes a mandatory requirement but
does not express whether failure to satisfy that requirement strips jurisdiction, courts “begin with
the presumption that the [l]egislature did not intend to make the [statutory requirement]
jurisdictional” and that presumption is “overcome only be clear legislative intent to the contrary.”
City of DeSoto v. White, 288 S.W.3d 389, 394 (Tex. 2009).
35. 326 S.W.3d 654, 667 (Tex. App. 2010).
36. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.204(c) (West 2011).
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were compelled by the language of Texas’s DoMA, the court’s holding
would be understandable. It is simply not the case, however, that
Texas’s DoMA requires such a reading. In fact, another Texas appellate
court later offered two ways to interpret Texas’s DoMA so as to pre-
serve jurisdiction to grant divorce to same-sex couples.37 One such read-
ing is to understand “divorce [a]s a ‘benefit’ of state residency, rather
than a . . . ‘benefit’ . . . resulting from marriage.”38 Granting a divorce,
then, would not require the court to provide marriage-like benefits to the
same-sex couple, which is what Texas’s DoMA forbids.39 The second
rationale proffered by the Texas court was that the Texas DoMA only
prohibits courts “from taking actions that create, recognize, or give
effect to same-sex marriages on a ‘going-forward’ basis . . . .”40 Divorce
terminates the marriage but does not grant “going-forward” privileges.
Under either of these alternative readings, Texas’s DoMA can be read to
preserve subject-matter jurisdiction over same-sex divorce.41 Such a
reading not only protects the broad jurisdiction of the state court, but
also honors the language of the statute and avoids the significant state
and federal constitutional quandaries that arise when jurisdiction over a
dispute is stripped from the trial court and essentially disappears from
the state.
Texas’s DoMA is not unique in its language or structure. Other
state DoMAs similarly provide that marriage is a civil contract between
one man and one woman42 or that marriage can be entered into only by
persons of the opposite sex.43 These DoMAs do not affect the trial
court’s general jurisdictional power. Absent explicit jurisdiction-strip-
ping language, trial courts retain the power to hear petitions for same-
sex divorce.
B. The Statutory Roots of Modern Divorce Law Do Not
Prevent Courts from Exercising Subject-Matter
Jurisdiction over Same-Sex Divorce
In same-sex divorce cases, confusion over subject-matter jurisdic-
37. State v. Naylor, 330 S.W.3d 434, 441–42 (Tex. App. 2011).
38. Id. at 441 (quoting TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.204(c) (West 2011)).
39. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.204(c).
40. Naylor, 330 S.W.3d at 441.
41. The narrow issue before the Naylor court was whether the state had standing to intervene.
Id. at 439. The court, however, provided a cogent interpretation of its DoMA. Id. at 441.
42. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-104(1) (West 2012) (“[A] marriage is valid in this
state if . . . [i]t is only between one man and one woman.”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 517.01 (West
2012) (“Marriage . . . is a civil contract between a man and a woman . . . .”).
43. E.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 31-11-1-1 (LexisNexis 2012) (“Only a female may marry a male.
Only a male may marry a female.”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3101.01(A) (LexisNexis 2012) (“A
marriage may only be entered into by one man and one woman.”).
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tion also stems from the frequently invoked, but seldom explained, tru-
ism that divorce is statutory.44 Some courts have premised their denial of
same-sex divorce petitions on the ground that they lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction because their state’s divorce statute did not provide for
same-sex divorce.45 An example of this misapprehension of subject-mat-
ter jurisdiction is found in a recent Wyoming trial court’s dismissal of a
same-sex divorce petition.46 Although ultimately reversed by the Wyo-
ming Supreme Court, the trial court’s reasoning in Christiansen v.
Christiansen is illustrative. The trial court began by noting that Wyo-
ming’s DoMA statute defines marriage as a civil contract between a man
and a woman.47 Reasoning that “the jurisdictional grant to dissolve mar-
riages is premised on the definition of marriage provided in [the Wyo-
ming DoMA statute],” the court concluded that “Wyoming statutes do
not grant the [c]ourt jurisdiction to dissolve a same-sex marriage” and
dismissed the divorce petition for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.48 In
other words, the court looked to the state DoMA statute to determine
whether the court had subject-matter jurisdiction over a same-sex
divorce. This “divorce is statutory” argument can also be found in briefs
of parties and amici opposing petitions for same-sex divorce in various
state trial courts.49 This argument, however, is wrong.
44. 27A C.J.S. Divorce § 148 (2012) (“The power to grant a divorce is a statutory, and not a
common-law, power.” (footnote omitted)); see also, Bitner v. Bitner, 176 N.W.2d 162, 164 (Iowa
1970) (“Divorce under Iowa law is strictly statutory.”); Ruprecht v. Ruprecht, 96 N.W.2d 14, 22
(Minn. 1959) (“Divorces are purely statutory and follow the course of equity so far as the same is
applicable.”); Northrup v. Northrup, 373 N.E.2d 1221, 1223 (N.Y. 1978) (“The courts of this State
have no common-law jurisdiction over divorce or its incidents. The power to modify a provision
for alimony is only such as is conferred by statute.” (citations omitted)); Wood v. Wood, 320
S.W.2d 807, 810 (Tex. 1959) (“‘The right to apply for or obtain a divorce is not a natural one, but
is accorded only by reason of statute, and the state has the right to determine who are entitled to
use its courts for that purpose and upon what conditions they may do so.’” (quoting 17 AM. JUR.
Divorce and Separation § 8 (1957))).
45. E.g., Christiansen v. Christiansen, No. 2010-266, slip op. at ¶¶ 6, 14–15 (Wyo. Dist. Ct.
Nov. 8, 2010), rev’d, 253 P.3d 153 (Wyo. 2011).
46. Id.
47. Id. at ¶ 6.
48. Id. at ¶¶ 14–15.
49. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of Senator Delbert Scott at 1, Sparks v. Mauceri-Sparks,
No. 07BU-CV04904 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Apr. 1, 2008), available at http://www.npgdigital.net /files/
sparks_amicus_brief.pdf. In Sparks, the trial court denied a motion to dismiss premised on lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction. See Order Denying Motion to Dismiss, Sparks v. Mauceri-Sparks, No.
07BU-CV04904 (Mo. Dist. Ct. Mar. 18, 2008). Amicus Senator Delbert Scott argued that
Missouri courts lack jurisdiction to hear petitions for same-sex divorce because divorce
jurisdiction depends on statute. Brief Amicus Curiae of Senator Delbert Schott at 2-3 (quoting
London v. London, 826 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992)). Similarly, the Texas Attorney
General, in his Response to the State of Texas to the Petition for Review in In re Marriage of J.B.
& H.B., argued that a valid opposite-sex marriage is a prerequisite to the Texas court’s jurisdiction
in divorce cases. Response of the State of Texas to the Petition for Review at 3–4, In re Marriage
of J.B. & H.B., No. 11-0024, 2011 WL 1113415 (Tex. Mar. 21, 2011).
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The “divorce is statutory” truism is readily found in state court mat-
rimonial jurisprudence, but because it is rarely explained, the phrase has
the potential to mislead courts facing petitions for same-sex divorce.
These courts might presume that because divorce as we understand it
today did not exist at common law, their only jurisdiction over divorce
must necessarily derive from statutes. Historically speaking, however,
that underlying presumption is incorrect. While it is true that the colo-
nies inherited from England the tradition that “[m]atrimonial actions
were not known to the common-law courts, but were instead a creation
of the ecclesiastical courts,”50 individuals seeking freedom from their
matrimonial bonds could nonetheless find judicial as well as legislative
relief.51 The House of Lords granted legislative divorce, as did many
early legislatures in the United States.52 More important for our pur-
poses, some common law courts in the colonies followed the tradition of
the common law courts of England by asserting jurisdiction over causes
of action similar to divorce.53 At that time, courts of equity and courts of
law granted certain relief, albeit in different ways. Modern courts have
by and large abandoned the distinction between courts of equity and
courts of law: judges get just one hat, and it has the powers of both law
and equity.54 The claim that a court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction
over same-sex divorce because divorce is statutory is therefore histori-
cally inaccurate.55
50. Lacks v. Lacks, 359 N.E.2d 384, 388 (N.Y. 1976) (citing Langerman v. Langerman, 104
N.E.2d 857, 858–59 (N.Y. 1952)).
51. NELSON MANFRED BLAKE, THE ROAD TO RENO: A HISTORY OF DIVORCE IN THE UNITED
STATES 34–40 (1962) (discussing both judicial and legislative divorce in the American colonies).
52. Id. at 32–40; 9 RULING CASE LAW, Divorce and Separation §§ 20–24 (William M.
McKinney et al. eds., 1929); RILEY, supra note 1, at 34–36. The practice of legislative divorce R
seems curious to modern day couples because it ceased in the mid-1800s when states began to
pass constitutional and legal bans on legislative divorce. Id. at 36.
53. BLAKE, supra note 51, at 38 (explaining that courts in Massachusetts often handled R
divorces, whereas in Connecticut divorce was often a legislative function); see also 9 RULING
CASE LAW, supra note 52, at § 190 (“[C]ourts of equity in this country have, as a general rule, R
assumed inherent jurisdiction to decree the annulment of marriages for certain causes which under
the law as administered in the ecclesiastical courts were ground for a divorce a vinculo matrimonii
[from the bonds of matrimony].” (footnote omitted)). Even in the conservative southern colonies,
unhappily married couples could obtain “divorces of bed and board” which permitted couples to
live apart and permitted a court to order maintenance but did not permit parties to remarry. RILEY,
supra note 1, at 25–26. R
54. DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION § 2.6(1) (2d ed.
1993).
55. The assertion that “divorce is statutory” is appropriate to limit a court’s exercise of extra-
statutory remedies in cases that are covered by the state’s divorce statute. For example, if a statute
limits alimony, the court’s ability to order additional alimony-like payments would be
circumscribed. In that sense, the phrase “divorce is statutory” makes sense, but we suggest
abandoning the phrase because it is misleading.
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C. Even in States with Family Courts of Limited Jurisdiction, Courts
Have Subject-Matter Jurisdiction over Same-Sex Divorce
A third jurisdictional muddle over same-sex divorce arises in states
that have created family courts with limited jurisdiction. In a handful of
jurisdictions, the state has created a special court to hear family law
cases, including divorce.56 In Rhode Island, for example, the family
court’s jurisdiction is limited to issues surrounding divorce and chil-
dren.57 The placement of divorce in a specialized court raises the poten-
tial for same-sex couples seeking divorce to be caught betwixt and
between, which is what happened to a same-sex couple in a 2007 Rhode
Island case. In Chambers v. Ormiston, two Rhode Island residents who
had been married in Massachusetts petitioned for divorce in Rhode
Island’s family court.58 The family court questioned its own jurisdiction
and certified the jurisdiction question to the Rhode Island Supreme
Court.59 A divided court ruled that the family court did not have juris-
diction over same-sex divorce, reasoning that when the legislature cre-
ated the family court, it could not have envisioned same-sex marriage so
it could not have vested jurisdiction over same-sex divorce in the family
court.60
The majority’s analysis is questionable on several levels, but what
is crucial when considering jurisdiction is that both the majority and
dissent indicated that under the facts, no forum existed to provide relief
for these parties. As the dissent rails and the majority regrets, the denial
of access to Rhode Island’s Family Court apparently leaves the parties in
“a virtual legal limbo, unable to extricate themselves from [their Massa-
chusetts marriage]”61 because “the Rhode Island Family Court is the
56. The states of South Carolina, Delaware, Rhode Island, and West Virginia have family
courts of limited jurisdiction. S.C. CONST. art. V, § 11 (granting original jurisdiction to circuit
courts, except in those cases in which exclusive jurisdiction is given to inferior courts); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 63-3-530 (2011) (creating family courts with exclusive jurisdiction in domestic matters);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 921 (West 2012) (identifying the jurisdiction of Delaware’s family
court); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-10-3 (2011) (identifying the jurisdiction of Rhode Island’s family
court); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 51-2A-2 (West 2012) (establishing the jurisdiction of family courts).
In addition, the Louisiana legislature has the power to establish a separate family court but has
done so for only one parish. LA. CONST. art. V, §§ 16(A), 18 (granting original jurisdiction to
district courts but limiting jurisdiction of juvenile and family courts); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13:1401 (2011) (establishing family court for the parish of East Baton Rouge). We do not mean
this discussion to include courts’ internal organizational decisions, such as when a court, for its
own administrative convenience, assigns certain judges to the “family calendar.”
57. About the Family Court, RHODE ISLAND JUDICIARY, 1 http://www.courts.ri.gov/Courts/
FamilyCourt/PDFs/AbouttheFamilyCourt.pdf (last visited Sept. 14, 2012).
58. 935 A.2d 956, 958–59 (R.I. 2007).
59. Id. at 958.
60. Id. at 962, 967. The Rhode Island Supreme Court has five members; two dissented. Id. at
967.
61. Id. at 973 (Suttell, J., dissenting).
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only forum available to them to terminate their marriage.”62 The impli-
cations of this extraordinary conclusion do not appear to have been con-
templated by either the majority or dissent. If the parties truly have no
forum to terminate their marriage, then the Rhode Island General
Assembly effectively rendered a cause of action moot, not by eliminat-
ing the cause of action, but by an inadvertent jurisdictional sleight of
hand.
Consider the following analogy to a minor’s access to the funda-
mental right to abortion. Suppose a state legislature seeks to limit access
to abortion by requiring minors to obtain parental consent prior to the
abortion. Supreme Court precedent requires that the state set up a system
through which the minor can bypass the parental consent requirement
and receive consent from a court, rather than her parents, for the proce-
dure.63 It would be constitutionally problematic if the state’s family
court of limited jurisdiction disclaimed the ability to hear such petitions
because of its statutorily limited jurisdiction, while the state’s general
trial court disclaimed jurisdiction because family matters have been
located in the family court. This minor would also be caught betwixt and
between with her federal constitutional right being denied based on a
perceived lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. It cannot be that no state
court has jurisdiction over the minor’s petition. If it turns out that the
limited family court does not have jurisdiction, then jurisdiction over the
minor’s petition must remain in the state trial court.
Neither the majority nor the dissent in Chambers contemplated that
if the Rhode Island Family Court is unavailable to hear a same-sex
divorce petition, then the parties nonetheless could find relief in Rhode
Island’s courts of general jurisdiction. Absent such a conclusion, this
example illustrates the constitutional quandary that the Rhode Island
court’s conclusion invites.
Forty-nine states have subject-matter jurisdiction over same-sex
divorce. With the exception of Georgia, state DoMAs do not strip courts
of subject-matter jurisdiction; state divorce statutes do not dictate
whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction; and unless a state has
granted a specialty court jurisdiction over same-sex divorce, the state
trial court of general jurisdiction retains subject-matter jurisdiction over
same-sex divorce petitions. As such, state courts cannot refuse to hear
62. Id. at 970. The majority agreed that the parties are in a virtual legal limbo. Id. at 966–67
(majority opinion) (noting that its decision will be “cold comfort” to the parties, and suggesting
that the parties’ remedy lies with the legislature).
63. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 647 (1979) (declaring that if a state requires parental
notification for a minor’s decision to have an abortion, the state must also provide access to the
courts as an avenue for the minor to obtain authorization to seek an abortion in lieu of the parental
consent).
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same-sex divorce petitions by asserting that the courts lack subject-mat-
ter jurisdiction.
III. STATE DOMAS DO NOT PROHIBIT STATE COURTS FROM
GRANTING RELIEF IN SAME-SEX DIVORCE CASES
Careful examination of dismissed same-sex divorce cases reveals
that although courts often assert that they lack subject-matter jurisdiction
over same-sex divorce, the issue they are really grappling with is
whether they have the authority to grant relief. As stated above, nearly
all state courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over same-sex divorce.
Thus, the next hurdle for same-sex couples seeking divorce can be estab-
lishing a claim for which relief can be granted.
In cases where courts did acknowledge jurisdiction over same-sex
divorce, some went on to dismiss the divorce petitions on the premise
that their state’s DoMA, or the absence of any state law recognizing
same-sex marriages, prevented them from granting relief.64 Like the
assertion that courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction, this assertion is
false. With only one exception, no state DoMA explicitly or implicitly
denies courts the power to grant same-sex divorce.
A. DoMA Statutes Do Not Explicitly Prohibit a Court from
Granting a Same-Sex Divorce
By carefully examining the express statutory language of state
DoMAs and their corresponding legislative history, the vast majority of
DoMAs do not explicitly prohibit a court from granting relief to same-
sex couples seeking divorce. Only Georgia’s DoMA includes explicit
language pertaining to how same-sex marriages from other states should
be treated by the courts for the purpose of divorce.65 The silence coming
from all other states on this issue likely stems from the simple reality
that DoMAs are about marriage, not divorce. DoMAs were enacted to
prevent same-sex couples from marrying in a different state and then
demanding the rights, responsibilities, and privileges of marriage from
their home state.66 DoMAs were not created to prevent same-sex couples
64. E.g., Gonzalez v. Green, 831 N.Y.S.2d 856, 859 (Sup. Ct. 2006) (dismissing the claim for
divorce on the grounds that the Massachusetts marriage was void and plaintiff failed to state a
claim for which relief could be granted despite the fact that New York did not have a state
DoMA); Irwin v. Lupardus, No. 4137, 1980 WL 355015, at *1–2 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980) (affirming
the lower court’s determination that relief could not be granted for same-sex divorce).
65. GA. CONST. art. I, § 4, para. 1(b). For the language of every state DoMA, see Erica A.
Holzer, Defense of Marriage Acts: A Fifty State Survey, MITCHELL OPEN ACCESS (Mar. 5, 2012),
http://open.wmitchell.edu/stusch/1.
66. See, e.g., MISS. CONST. art. XIV, § 263A (“Marriage may take place and may be valid
under the laws of this state only between a man and a woman. A marriage in another state or
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from getting divorced. This same conclusion was reached by a Washing-
ton state court in Gill v. Adkins.67 In that proceeding, a same-sex couple
seeking divorce faced a state DoMA that declared same-sex marriages
from other jurisdictions to be invalid in Washington.68 The Gill court
nonetheless entered a decree of dissolution, explaining that the text of
the state DoMA did not impact its ability to grant a same-sex divorce.69
The original intent of state DoMAs supports the textual reading that
these laws were never intended to implicate divorce. The intent propel-
ling the enactment of state DoMAs concerned the granting and recogniz-
ing of same-sex marriages—not same-sex divorce.70 State marriage
policy has to do with what types of relationships the state wants to sanc-
tion and what types of family structures the state wants to endorse. State
DoMAs were drafted to specify that the state’s marriage policy does not
condone same-sex marriage. State divorce policy, however, is quite dif-
ferent. Divorce policy focuses on the process of facilitating an efficient
and equitable disentanglement of a couple’s affairs.71 Broadly speaking,
although any divorce is arguably against the state’s interests in marriage,
states have decided that forcing acrimonious couples to stay married is
even worse.72 As such, although DoMA restrictions on who can marry
foreign jurisdiction between persons of the same gender, regardless of when the marriage took
place, may not be recognized in this state and is void and unenforceable under the laws of this
state.”).
67. No. 09-3-01572-1, slip op. at ¶ 3.1 (Wash. Super. Ct. Feb. 5, 2010) (granting a dissolution
of marriage of a same-sex couple).
68. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.020(1)(c) (West 2005) (subsection repealed 2012) (prohibiting
marriages between parties “other than a male and female”); see id. § 26.04.020(3) (stating that
marriages from other jurisdictions are invalid if prohibited under Washington law).
69. See Gill, slip op. at ¶ 3.1; Laura McVicker, Clark County’s First Same-Sex Divorce
Finalized by Judge, THE COLUMBIAN, Feb. 10, 2010, http://www.columbian.com/news/2010/Feb/
10/clark-countys-first-same-sex-divorce-finalized-by; see also Port v. Cowan, 44 A.3d 970 (Md.
2012).
70. It is difficult to establish what lawmakers were not thinking. We can establish, though,
that the lawmakers were thinking and talking about marriage. Consider this excerpt from a
comprehensive article telling the story of the enactment of state DoMAs:
The year is 1993 and the Hawaii Supreme Court has just declared—as a matter of
state constitutional law—that the state prohibition of same-sex marriage constitutes
gender discrimination. Within a few years, thirty-five states enacted laws
prohibiting the recognition of same-sex marriages and Congress, responding “to a
very particular development in the State of Hawaii,” enacted the Defense of
Marriage Act.
Neal Devins, How State Supreme Courts Take Consequences Into Account: Toward a State-
Centered Understanding of State Constitutionalism, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1629, 1630 (2010)
(footnotes omitted). It is telling that in this article Professor Devins does not mention the word
“divorce.”
71. See, e.g., 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3102(a) (West 2012) (stating the policy of
Pennsylvania’s divorce code).
72. This is evidenced by the adoption of no-fault divorce regimes throughout the states. See
P.B. v. L.B., 855 N.Y.S.2d 836, 839 (2008) (“Implicit in the statutory scheme is the legislative
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are consistent with the state’s alleged interests in marriage, suggesting
that DoMAs also restrict who can divorce is in direct contravention of
the state’s interests when it comes to divorce.
A good example of a court looking to the intent behind a state
DoMA to interpret its language arose in Ohio in the context of domestic
violence. In State v. Carswell, the Ohio Supreme Court determined that
Ohio’s constitutional DoMA, enacted by ballot initiative, did not pre-
clude same-sex married partners from utilizing domestic violence stat-
utes that criminalized domestic violence between spouses.73 The court
determined that voter intent in enacting the DoMA was to prevent the
creation or recognition of a legal status for same-sex couples that
approximates marriage through legislative, executive, or judicial
action—not to deny same-sex couples access to domestic violence stat-
utes.74 As such, the court held that giving same-sex couples access to
domestic violence statutes did not contradict the state’s constitutional
DoMA.
The text and intent of state DoMAs reveal that state legislatures
simply did not contemplate the situation now facing same-sex couples
seeking divorce. Divorce never entered the DoMA debate in part
because the policies behind marriage are so vastly different from the
policies behind divorce. Examining the text and intent of state DoMAs
reveal that DoMA statutes do not explicitly—nor were they ever
intended to—prevent a court from granting relief to same-sex couples
seeking divorce.75
recognition that it is socially and morally undesirable to compel parties to a dead marriage to
retain an illusory and deceptive status and that the best interests not only of the parties but of
society itself will be furthered by enabling them ‘to extricate themselves from a perpetual state of
marital limbo.’” (citation omitted)).
73. 871 N.E.2d 547, 554 (Ohio 2007) (holding that “the term ‘person living as a spouse’ as
defined in [Ohio’s domestic violence statute] . . . does not create or recognize a legal relationship
that approximates the designs, qualities, or significance of marriage as prohibited by Section 11,
Article XV of the Ohio Constitution”). Ohio’s DoMA states:
Only a union between one man and one woman may be a marriage valid in or
recognized by this state and its political subdivisions. This state and its political
subdivisions shall not create or recognize a legal status for relationships of
unmarried individuals that intends to approximate the design, qualities, significance
or effect of marriage.
OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11.
74. Carswell, 871 N.E.2d at 553–54. Determining the collective intent of thousands of voters
poses an interesting challenge, but most scholars agree that the ordinary rules of construction
apply to constitutional amendments. See 5 MICH. CIV. JUR. Constitutional Law § 17 (2012).
75. The sole exception, as we discuss above, is the state of Georgia. See GA. CONST. art I, § 4,
para. 1(b).
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B. DoMA Statutes Do Not Implicitly Prohibit a Court from
Granting a Same-Sex Divorce
Although only Georgia’s DoMA explicitly prevents a court from
granting a same-sex divorce, the absence of such a provision in other
DoMAs does not preclude arguments that these DoMAs implicitly pre-
vent courts from doing so. Courts accepting such arguments have been
persuaded by specific language in their state’s DoMA. The language of
various state DoMAs regarding the court’s power to grant relief can be
divided into four groups: (1) DoMAs declaring same-sex marriages void
or void ab initio; (2) DoMAs that prohibit a court from “recognizing” or
“giving effect to” same-sex marriages performed in other states; (3)
DoMAs that prohibit courts from granting any “benefit of marriage” to a
same-sex couple; and (4) DoMAs that define marriage as only a union of
“one man and one woman.”76 It is our contention that none of this statu-
tory language implicitly prohibits same-sex divorce. Regardless of the
language found in a state DoMA, courts have the power to grant relief to
same-sex couples seeking divorce.
1. DOMAS THAT DECLARE SAME-SEX MARRIAGES VOID OR VOID
AB INITIO DO NOT PROHIBIT SAME-SEX DIVORCE
Some state DoMAs flatly declare that same-sex marriages per-
formed in other jurisdictions are void77 or void ab initio.78 The key ques-
tion raised in these jurisdictions is whether a court can dissolve a void
marriage. The answer, simply put, is yes. Courts have been dissolving
void marriages for over two centuries, taking at least two approaches to
do so. One approach grants dissolution without recognizing the marriage
as valid. The second approach recognizes the marriage for the limited
purpose of granting a divorce. Both of these methods are viable in juris-
dictions with DoMAs that declare same-sex marriages to be void
because neither approach requires the court to rule, or even opine, on the
validity of the marriage before it.
76. See Holzer, supra note 65, at 2–4. R
77. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 701 (2011) (“When residents of this State,
with intent to evade this section and to return and reside here, go into another state or country to
have their marriage solemnized there and afterwards return and reside here, that marriage is void
in this State. . . . Any marriage performed in another state that would violate any provisions of
subsections 2 to 5 if performed in this State is not recognized in this State and is considered void if
the parties take up residence in this State.” (section 5 prohibits same-sex marriage)); see also id.
§ 751.
78. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1709 (9th ed. 2009) (defining void ab initio as “[n]ull
from the beginning . . .”); see, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-1-1(2) (West 2011) (“Any marriage
between persons of the same gender is prohibited and null and void from the beginning. Any
marriage between persons of the same gender that is valid in another jurisdiction does not
constitute a legal or valid marriage in Mississippi.”).
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Courts have long been willing to divorce parties to void marriages
because, in so doing, they need not recognize the marriage as valid.79 In
her preeminent book on the history of divorce, Glenda Riley noted that
as early as 1745, a Massachusetts man obtained a divorce despite the
fact that his marriage was legally void because of his status as a slave.80
Similarly, in putative spouse cases, divorce is an available remedy to
parties who entered their marriage in good faith even though the mar-
riage is technically void.81 As the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated, the
divorce proceeding in a putative spouse case “merely establishe[s] the
status of the parties toward each other as judicially separated and
absolved from all obligations of a marital nature existing between
them.”82 In other words, a court need not “recognize” a marriage that is
deemed void under its state’s law in order to provide the remedy of
divorce.83
As an equally sufficient alternative, matrimonial jurisprudence is
littered with examples of courts recognizing void marriages for a spe-
cific, limited purpose without validating the marriage as a whole. This
“incidental approach” has been used for decades—especially by courts
facing petitions from couples that are not accepted by society for moral
reasons.84 For example, in 1953, the Court of Appeals of New York
recognized an out-of-state incestuous marriage between an uncle and
niece for the purpose of distributing the wife’s estate upon her death,
despite a New York statute that would have prohibited the couple from
marrying in New York.85 Additionally, in In re Dalip Singh Bir’s Estate,
the California Court of Appeals held that two women could share in
their deceased husband’s estate despite the fact that the second marriage
was polygamous and therefore void.86 Similarly, the Supreme Court of
79. See, e.g., Blumenthal v. Blumenthal, 275 P. 987, 989 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1929)
(“[D]ivorce is not conclusive that a marriage actually existed at the time of the divorce between
the parties to the action in which the divorce was granted.”)
80. RILEY, supra note 1, at 14.
81. See Hicklin v. Hicklin, 509 N.W.2d 627, 631 (Neb. 1994) (ordering a wife to be
compensated as if there were a dissolution of marriage even though the marriage was void). A
putative spouse is typically granted many of the rights of an actual spouse, such as alimony. See,
e.g., Mabry v. Mabry, 452 So. 2d 248, 249–50 (La. Ct. App. 1984) (entitling the putative spouse
to the civil effects of marriage and affirming the district court’s decree, which recognized a
putative spouse and awarded alimony).
82. Oborn v. State, 126 N.W. 737, 744 (Wis. 1910).
83. See, e.g., Beth R. v. Donna M., 853 N.Y.S.2d 501, 505 (Sup. Ct. 2008).
84. See generally Barbara J. Cox, Using an “Incidents of Marriage” Analysis When
Considering Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Couples’ Marriages, Civil Unions, and Domestic
Partnerships, 13 WIDENER L.J. 699, 722–57 (2004).
85. In re May’s Estate, 114 N.E.2d 4, 4–7 (N.Y. 1953).
86. 188 P.2d 499, 502 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1948); see also Albina Engine & Mach. Works v.
O’Leary, 328 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1964) (granting death benefits to a woman whose marriage was
invalid because her husband was technically married to another woman).
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Mississippi recognized an interracial couple’s out-of-state marriage for
inheritance purposes even though the Mississippi Constitution and a
state statute voided interracial marriages within the state.87 In all three of
these cases, the courts were explicit in stating that they considered these
marriages to be absolutely void, yet each of these courts was able to
provide relief by focusing on the narrow issue before it.
As outlined by these examples, a court need not recognize a mar-
riage as valid in order to provide the remedy of divorce. Slaves, putative
spouses, and couples in incestuous, polygamous, and interracial mar-
riages that are void under state law have previously sought and obtained
judicial relief. Therefore, without explicit statutory language to the con-
trary, courts can grant same-sex couples divorces even if the state
DoMA declares that the couple’s marriage is void.
2. DOMAS THAT PROHIBIT “RECOGNIZING” OR “GIVING EFFECT TO”
SAME-SEX MARRIAGES PERFORMED IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
DO NOT PROHIBIT SAME-SEX DIVORCE
Twenty state DoMAs contain language that prohibits “recognizing”
or “giving effect to” a same-sex marriage from another jurisdiction.88
Some courts have found that this type of DoMA prevents them from
divorcing same-sex couples. For example, in In re Marriage of J.B. &
H.B., a Texas Court of Appeals held that it could not grant a same-sex
divorce because Texas’s statutory DoMA prohibits courts from giving
effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding that validates a
same-sex marriage in Texas or any jurisdiction.89 Since the couple’s
Massachusetts marriage certificate was a public record that validated the
couple’s same-sex marriage, the court determined that presiding over the
couple’s divorce petition—even if only to deny the petition—would be
giving that certificate some legal effect.90
As previously discussed, the J.B. court erred in its analysis of its
DoMA’s effect on subject-matter jurisdiction. The court misappre-
hended the impact of Texas’ DoMA on its ability to grant relief. That
mistake is highlighted by the court’s conclusion that Texas’s DoMA for-
87. Miller v. Lucks, 36 So. 2d 140, 141–42 (Miss. 1948).
88. See Erica A. Holzer, DoMA Statutes and Same-Sex Divorce Litigation, MITCHELL OPEN
ACCESS, 2–3 (Mar. 5, 2012), http://open.wmitchell.edu/stusch/2. See also, e.g., TEX. CONST. art. I,
§ 32(b) (“This state or a political subdivision of this state may not create or recognize any legal
status identical or similar to marriage.” (emphasis added)); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.212(2) (West
2012) (“The state, its agencies, and its political subdivisions may not give effect to any public act,
record, or judicial proceeding of any state . . . or any other place or location respecting either a
marriage or relationship [between persons of the same-sex] or a claim arising from such a
marriage or relationship.” (emphasis added)).
89. 326 S.W.3d 654, 665, 667 (Tex. App. 2010).
90. Id. at 665.
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bade it from dissolving a same-sex marriage because doing so would
“give effect to” the marriage, while then going on to state that this same
DoMA would not forbid a court from declaring the same-sex marriage
void.91 The court asserted, without analysis, that divorce presupposes a
valid and lawful marriage, and therefore requires the court to recognize
the same-sex marriage, while a decree of voidness does not.92 It is
unclear why a voidness proceeding that would provide nearly all the
same relief as a divorce—including property division, custody determi-
nations, name changes, temporary restraining orders, and a legal termi-
nation of the marriage—could be done without “recognizing” the
relationship. It would certainly seem that if no “recognition” or “authori-
zation” is necessary to determine the legal status of parties in a voidness
proceeding, then there is no logical reason why such recognition would
be necessary in a divorce proceeding.
DoMA statutes were enacted to prevent couples from marrying
elsewhere and then demanding the benefits and rights that flow from
marriage. Granting a divorce is not what legislatures had in mind when
they decreed that courts could not “give effect to” a marriage license
from another state. A Texas Court of Appeals in the case of State v.
Naylor considered this analysis plausible.93 Reading the same Texas
DoMA provision analyzed by the J.B. court, the Naylor court reasoned
that the plain language of Texas’s DoMA could allow the court to grant
relief to same-sex couples seeking divorce.94 According to Naylor, one
could argue that Texas courts are merely prohibited from “giv[ing]
effect to same-sex marriages on a ‘going-forward’ basis, so that the
granting of a divorce would be permissible.”95 In other words, the Texas
DoMA could be read as prohibiting giving same-sex marriages effect
only in the sense of allowing couples to pursue rights and responsibili-
ties that flow from an ongoing marriage; such a reading does not pro-
hibit giving the marriage effect by granting the couple a divorce. Thus,
even states with DoMAs prohibiting “recognizing” or “giving effect to”
same-sex marriages can grant a same-sex divorce because providing
such relief neither requires courts to recognize nor give effect to that
marriage.
91. Id. at 667.
92. Id.
93. 330 S.W.3d 434, 441 (Tex. App. 2011).
94. Id.
95. Id. (emphasis added). Similarly, a West Virginia judge dissolved a Vermont civil union,
holding that “[t]he parties are citizens of West Virginia in need of a judicial remedy to dissolve a
legal relationship created by the laws of another state.” In re Marriage of Gorman & Gump, No.
02-D-292, slip op. at ¶ IX (W. Va. Fam. Ct. Dec. 19, 2002). At the time, West Virginia had a state
DoMA similar to Texas’s. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-2-603 (West 2012) (effective Sept. 1,
2001).
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3. DOMAS THAT PROHIBIT GRANTING ANY “BENEFITS OF
MARRIAGE” TO SAME-SEX COUPLES DO NOT
PROHIBIT SAME-SEX DIVORCE
A third group of DoMAs are those that include language prohibit-
ing courts from granting any “benefits of marriage” to same-sex couples
married in other states.96 Concluding that this language also prohibits a
court from granting a same-sex couple a divorce requires a determina-
tion that divorce is a “benefit” of marriage. It is not. Benefits of mar-
riage are typically thought to be the  rights and privileges that flow from
a legal marriage. Examples of such benefits include filing joint state
income tax returns; inheriting a share of a spouse’s estate; receiving
exemptions from state estate and gift taxes; receiving wages, workers’
compensation, and retirement plan benefits for a deceased spouse; mak-
ing medical decisions for a spouse should the spouse become incapaci-
tated; and receiving state medical, disability, and education benefits.97
Couples get married, in part, to gain access to these advantages. Further,
these benefits are exactly what state legislators sought to prevent same-
sex couples from obtaining when they enacted DoMAs that explicitly
deny same-sex couples the benefits of marriage. An obvious reason
divorce is not listed among these benefits is that, unlike inheritance
rights, for example, couples do not get married to gain access to divorce.
Indeed, divorce is an unfortunate result of a failed marriage, not a boon
offered only to those who are legally wed.
Still, some argue that divorce comes with certain benefits—such as
a mechanism for dividing property, determining custody, and obtaining
spousal support—so same-sex couples should be denied access to these
benefits. This argument fails for two reasons. First, excluding same-sex
couples from the benefits of marriage is not the same as excluding them
from the efficiencies of obtaining a judicial divorce. If the legislature
intended to do both, they could have stated as much.98 Second, this argu-
96. E.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 25.05.013(b) (West 2012) (“A same-sex relationship may not
be recognized by the state as being entitled to the benefits of marriage”); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art.
3520(B) (2011) (“A purported marriage between persons of the same sex violates a strong public
policy of the state of Louisiana and such a marriage contracted in another state shall not be
recognized in this state for any purpose, including the assertion of any right or claim as a result of
the purported marriage.”).
97. See A. Mechele Dickerson, Family Values and the Bankruptcy Code: A Proposal to
Eliminate Bankruptcy Benefits Awarded on the Basis of Marital Status, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 69,
87–88 (1999).
98. See, e.g., ASSEMB. JUDICIARY COMM., STATEMENT TO ASSEMB., Leg. 212-3787, 1st Sess.,
at 2 (N.J. 2006), available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2006/Bills/A4000/3787_S1.PDF. The
statement first declares that same-sex couples are entitled to the benefits of marriage. Id. (“The bill
provides that parties to a civil union would have all the same benefits, protections and
responsibilities under law, whether they derive from statute, administrative or court rule, public
policy, common law or any other source of civil law, as are granted to spouses in a marriage.”).
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ment fails to recognize that these “benefits” of divorce are already avail-
able to same-sex couples, even in non-recognizing states. Courts
regularly provide property division, custody orders, and spousal support
to couples—even same-sex couples—regardless of marital status.99 The
only relief that married same-sex couples cannot obtain is a legal disso-
lution of their marriage. The actual divorce decree is merely another way
courts provide relief to untangle legal relationships; it is not a “benefit”
of marriage.
A judge faced with a DoMA prohibiting her from granting any ben-
efit of marriage may well be precluded from granting a same-sex couple
a spousal share, workers’ compensation, loss of consortium damages,
and a myriad of other benefits that flow from legal marriage. This same
judge, however, is not precluded from granting the same couple a
divorce because divorce is not a benefit of marriage.
4. DOMAS THAT DEFINE MARRIAGE AS ONLY A UNION OF
“ONE MAN AND ONE WOMAN” DO NOT PROHIBIT
SAME-SEX DIVORCE
Finally, a handful of DoMAs simply define marriage as a union
between one man and one woman.100 When determining the implication
of these definitional DoMAs, perhaps more important than what these
DoMAs say is what they do not say. These DoMAs do not declare same-
sex marriages void, nor do they prohibit courts from recognizing same-
sex marriages validly performed in other states or from granting the ben-
efits of marriage to these couples. Instead, these DoMAs simply provide
a definition of marriage without prescribing how to treat same-sex mar-
riages from other jurisdictions.
The plain language of these definitional DoMAs indicates that the
state legislatures were interested in preserving marriage as a status avail-
able only to opposite-sex couples. The legislatures in these jurisdictions
Then, three sentences later—in a separate proclamation—the statement declares that same-sex
couples are entitled to the benefits of divorce. Id. (“The dissolution of civil unions would also
follow the same procedures and be subject to the same substantive rights and obligations that are
involved in the dissolution of a marriage.”). Had there been no difference between the benefits of
marriage and the benefits of divorce, the legislature would not have considered and discussed
these two institutions separately.
99. See, e.g., Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 662 (Cal. 2005) (holding a woman was
required to pay child support to her former same-sex partner when the couple planned for a child
conceived through artificial insemination and held the child out as their natural child).
100. Six states currently have such DoMAs. See Holzer, supra note 88, at 2 (listing Colorado,
Hawaii, Idaho, Maryland, North Carolina, and Oregon). See also, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. II, § 31
(“Only a union of one man and one woman shall be valid or recognized as a marriage in this
state.”); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 2-201 (West 2012) (“Only a marriage between a man and a
woman is valid in this State.”).
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could have included more specific restrictions, as other jurisdictions
have,101 but they did not. Therefore, as previously argued, it can be pre-
sumed that excluding these specific restrictions was intentional and any
reading of these definitional DoMAs as prohibiting divorce would
impermissibly amend the plain meaning of these statutes. The Maryland
Court of Appeals took just such a view when it recently dissolved a
California same-sex marriage.102 The court held that the plain wording
of its DoMA only precluded the court from recognizing same-sex mar-
riages performed in Maryland, not those validly performed in another
jurisdictions.103 An Iowa court  similarly dissolved a civil union under
its then-valid definitional DoMA in In re Marriage of Brown &
Perez.104 In 2003, Iowa’s DoMA stated that “[o]nly a marriage between
a male and a female is valid.”105 Nonetheless, the court terminated the
couple’s Vermont civil union and also distributed the couple’s prop-
erty.106 Likewise, in Glaser v. Grassman, a Minnesota court declared
that two women, who had been validly married in California, were
henceforth “single individuals, with all rights of an unmarried individ-
ual, and are free and clear of any continuing obligation to each other
deriving from their marriage . . . .”107
The legislative intent propelling the enactment of these definitional
101. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 101(d) (West 2009) (“A marriage obtained or
recognized outside the State between persons [of the same gender] shall not constitute a legal or
valid marriage within the State.”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-2508 (West 2012) (“It is the strong
public policy of this state only to recognize as valid marriages from other states that are between a
man and a woman.”); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1704 (West 2012) (“A marriage between
persons of the same sex which was entered into in another state or foreign jurisdiction, even if
valid where entered into, shall be void in this Commonwealth.”); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.2 (West
2012) (“Any marriage entered into by persons of the same sex in another state or jurisdiction shall
be void in all respects in Virginia and any contractual rights created by such marriage shall be
void and unenforceable”); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-2-603 (West 2012) (“A public act . . . of any
other state . . . respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a
marriage under the laws of the other state . . . shall not be given effect by this state.”).
102. Port v. Cowan, 44 A.3d 970 (Md. 2012).
103. Id. At 978 (“Other states intending to prevent recognition of valid foreign same-sex
marriages have done so expressly and clearly, rather than by implication, subtlety, or
indirection.”).
104. In re Marriage of Brown & Perez, No. CDCD 119660, slip op. at 1–2 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Dec.
24, 2003).
105. IOWA CODE § 595.2(1) (2009). Iowa’s DoMA was subsequently held unconstitutional.
Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 906–07 (Iowa 2009).
106. In re Marriage of Brown & Perez, slip op. at 2 (incorporating the Stipulation entered into
by the parties).
107. No. 27-CV-10-16600, slip op. at 3 (Minn. Dist. Ct. July 22, 2010). Minnesota’s DoMA
states that contractual rights granted by virtue of an out-of-state same-sex marriage or its
termination are unenforceable in Minnesota. MINN. STAT. § 517.03(b) (2011) (“A marriage
entered into by persons of the same sex, either under common law or statute, that is recognized by
another state or foreign jurisdiction is void in this state and contractual rights granted by virtue of
the marriage or its termination are unenforceable in this state.”).
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DoMAs concerned the granting and recognizing of same-sex marriages,
with a focus on who is allowed to marry and not who is allowed to
divorce. Like the even more proscriptive DoMAs previously discussed,
these DoMAs neither explicitly nor implicitly prevent a judge from
granting the remedy of divorce to married same-sex couples, and they
were never intended to do so.
IV. PATHWAYS TO SAME-SEX DIVORCE IN DOMA STATES
This Article has discussed and debunked initial roadblocks facing
same-sex couples seeking divorce. In sum, regardless of the type of
DoMA on the books, state trial courts have subject-matter jurisdiction to
hear petitions for same-sex divorce, and married same-sex couples seek-
ing a divorce state a valid claim for which relief can be granted. That
being established, this Part discusses three pathways to obtaining a
same-sex divorce: using the resident state’s divorce statutes, using the
marrying state’s divorce statutes, or obtaining declaratory relief.
A. Using the Resident State’s Divorce Statutes to Obtain a
Same-Sex Divorce
A same-sex couple can petition a court for a divorce under the
divorce statutes of their state of residence. Some statutes define divorce
as “the termination of the marital relationship between a husband and
wife.”108 Such statutes arguably create two prerequisites for dissolu-
tion—first, that the couple be married, and second, that the couple be of
the opposite sex.
Presumably, if a same-sex couple is seeking a divorce, the couple is
legally married, at least in some jurisdictions. The question might arise,
however, whether a couple can meet the statutory requirement of a
“marriage” in a state that considers that marriage invalid. A same-sex
couple can offer three responses to this question. First, even if the mar-
riage is invalid in their state of residency, the marriage is valid in several
other jurisdictions. Divorce statutes do not specify that the marriage
needs to be valid in the divorcing state and courts need not read such a
requirement into the statute.109 Second, the couple can argue that a void
marriage does not prevent a court from granting relief.110 As previously
108. E.g., MINN. STAT § 518.06 (2011).
109. See State v. Naylor, 330 S.W.3d 434, 441 (Tex. App. 2011); see also Salucco v.
Alldredge, No. 02E0087GC1, 2004 WL 864459, at *4–5 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 19, 2004)
(dissolving a Vermont civil union using Massachusetts law); Hammond v. Hammond, No. FM-11-
905-08B, slip op. at 2 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Feb. 6, 2009) (using New Jersey divorce law
rather than civil union dissolution law with respect to a Canadian same-sex marriage).
110. Simply because a marriage is invalid in the state in which the couple seeks divorce does
not mean relief cannot be granted. See supra Section III.B.1. But see Kern v. Taney, 11 Pa. D. &
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discussed, countless courts have divorced couples in void marriages.
Third, under the incidents of marriage approach previously discussed,
same-sex couples can ask the court to recognize their marriage for the
specific, limited purpose of divorce. For example, in Christiansen v.
Christiansen, the Wyoming Supreme Court recognized the existence of
a valid Canadian same-sex marriage for the limited purpose of establish-
ing a condition precedent to granting a divorce.111 The court clearly
stated that the recognition was “not tantamount to state recognition of an
ongoing same-sex marriage.”112 Under each of these arguments, the
court can find that a valid marriage exists for the purposes of the state
divorce statute.
Still, some courts may insist that their divorce statute includes a
second requirement: that the couple seeking the divorce be in a valid
opposite-sex marriage. This requirement, however, is misplaced. Courts
have often encountered gendered language in statutes—especially in
family law—and have applied gender-neutral readings in order to
address modern issues that previous legislatures did not consider.113 One
such example is statutes providing for second-parent adoptions.
Although many of these statutes refer to a husband and wife, courts have
applied these statutes to allow lesbians and gay men to adopt their
spouses’ children.114 Similarly, courts have applied a gender-neutral
reading to statutes regarding parentage of children conceived using
anonymously provided sperm and to child support obligations between
former same-sex partners.115 This trend continues in the context of
same-sex marriage. In 2011, a Maryland court ruled that “the spousal
privilege preventing spouses from being compelled to testify against one
another applies to a lesbian couple married in Washington DC . . . .”116
C. 5th 558, 563 (Ct. Comm. Pl. 2010) (“Without a legally recognizable marriage, relief under the
Divorce Code is simply not available.”).
111. 253 P.3d 153, 156 (Wyo. 2011); see also Carrejo v. Haught, No. D-0101-DM-2009-0504,
slip op. at 1–2 (N.M. Dist. Ct. Oct. 12, 2010) (recognizing the validity of a marriage for the
limited purpose of granting a divorce).
112. Christiansen, 253 P.3d at 156–157; see also id. 154 n.1 (“Our analysis is expressly
limited to the issue before us. Nothing in this opinion should be taken as applying to the
recognition of same-sex marriages legally solemnized in a foreign jurisdiction in any context other
than divorce. The question of recognition of such same-sex marriages for any other reason, being
not properly before us, is left for another day.”).
113. See Susan Frelich Appleton, Missing in Action? Searching for Gender Talk in the Same-
Sex Marriage Debate, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 97, 118 (2005) (“Even for laws rooted in
biology and procreation, gender neutrality is becoming the rule of the day.” (footnote omitted)).
114. See, e.g., In re K.M. & D.M., 653 N.E.2d 888, 893, 899 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (granting
right of second-parent adoption to same-sex couple despite statute’s use of the terms “husband”
and “wife”).
115. See Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 662 (Cal. 2005).
116. Zach Zagger, Maryland Court Recognizes Spousal Privilege for Same-Sex Married
Couple, JURIST (June 24, 2011, 8:55 AM), http://jurist.org/paperchase/2011/06/maryland-court-
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MIA\67-1\MIA101.txt unknown Seq: 28 31-OCT-12 8:50
28 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:1
In all of these cases, courts were dealing with outdated statutes adopted
by legislatures that had no reason to predict the emergence of such
issues. Same-sex divorce presents an analogous situation. As such, as in
other cases where same-sex couples have encountered statutes that
appear to be limited to opposite-sex couples, courts need not refuse to
grant a same-sex divorce due to the gendered language of typical
divorce statutes.
B. Using the Marrying State’s Divorce Statutes to Obtain a
Same-Sex Divorce
If a court refuses to provide relief under its own divorce statutes, a
same-sex couple can ask the court to apply the statutes of the marrying
state to dissolve the marriage. In Parker v. Waronker, after a New York
trial court determined it had jurisdiction to dissolve a Vermont civil
union, the court discussed the emerging New York public policy of pro-
tecting same-sex couples, and the fact that other New York cases have
enforced or adjudicated rights for same-sex couples under the principles
of comity.117 In response, the court determined that it had the power to
apply the relevant statutes from the marrying state and dissolved the
civil union under Vermont law.118
The application of another state’s laws is not a novel approach cre-
ated by the Parker court to deal with same-sex divorce cases. In fact,
courts routinely apply the laws of other forums, using well-established,
if occasionally messy, choice-of-law doctrines.119 Courts are often asked
to apply the law from another state pursuant to a choice-of-law clause.
When that is the case, the court looks for “significant contact or signifi-
cant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of
its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.”120 The application
of another state’s law is not limited, however, to instances in which there
is a valid choice-of-law clause. Courts often apply another state’s law to
non-contract disputes, such as in tort.121 Typically, the state whose law
recognizes-spousal-privilege-for-same-sex-married-couple.php. Cf. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW
§ 2-201 (West 2012) (“Only a marriage between a man and a woman is valid in this State.”).
117. 918 N.Y.S.2d 822, 823-24 (Sup. Ct. 2010).
118. Id. at 824–25.
119. See William A. Reppy, Jr., Eclecticism in Methods for Resolving Tort and Contract
Conflict of Laws: The United States and the European Union, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2053, 2054, 2056
(2008) (describing “three different theories employed in choice-of-law methodology to allocate to
a state’s control over resolution of a litigated claim or issue within a claim through applications of
its substantive law” and noting that on occasion, courts “combine[ ] two (or all three) of the
theories for allocating sovereignty to create a modern method of choice of law to resolve a
multiple-state claim or issue that is a part of the claim” (footnote omitted)).
120. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313 (1981).
121. Reppy, supra note 119, at 2054, 2056–57.
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will be applied must have a sufficient connection with the underlying
dispute or issue.122 In this instance, the fact that the marriage was
granted by a particular state should be sufficient to establish significant
contacts with that state.
Courts have applied choice-of-law clauses in the context of other
family law disputes, such as prenuptial agreements.123 Courts have scru-
tinized these clauses no differently than they would a choice-of-law
clause in a conventional business agreement. For example, the Minne-
sota Court of Appeals affirmed a district court decision to apply Califor-
nia law to a marriage dissolution pursuant to a prenuptial agreement.124
Courts have also enforced choice-of-law clauses in gestational surrogacy
agreements.125 Thus, should a state refuse to apply its own divorce stat-
utes to dissolve a same-sex marriage, applying the laws of the marrying
state is a viable option for same-sex couples seeking relief.
C. Obtaining a Declaratory Judgment
Should a court refuse to apply its own divorce statutes or the stat-
utes of the marrying state, a same-sex couple may still obtain equitable
relief.126 Every trial court has the inherent power to exercise equity juris-
diction—“to do equity and to mould each decree to the necessities of the
particular case.”127 When legal relief is unavailable or inadequate, trial
courts are authorized to supplement and expand existing law so that new
122. Hague, 449 U.S. at 312–13.
123. E.g., Jundt v. Jundt (In re Marriage of Jundt), Nos. A05-693, A05-955, 2006 WL 917592,
at *2–3 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 11, 2006) (applying choice-of-law provision in prenuptial
agreement).
124. Id. at *3 (“[W]e find no authority in [a case cited to by a party asking for closer scrutiny
of a choice of law provision in family-law cases] for the assertion that closer scrutiny of choice-
of-law provisions must be applied to an antenuptial agreement.”).
125. E.g., P.G.M. v. J.M.A. (In re Paternity & Custody of Baby Boy A.), No. A07-452, 2007
WL 4304448, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2007) (recognizing Minnesota’s traditional
enforcement of parties’ contractual choice-of-law provisions).
126. While distinct courts of equity still exist in some jurisdictions, in most states legal and
equitable remedies can be granted by any court. Despite this unification, the distinguishing
features of the two classes of remedies are clearly marked and widely recognized because of the
substantial difference between legal and equitable rights. See 27A AM. JUR. 2D Equity § 3 (2012)
(discussing the nature of equitable remedies); see also Taylor’s Marine, Inc. v. Waco Mfg., Inc.,
792 S.W.2d 286, 288 (Ark. 1990) (holding that because appellant’s “defenses were not
exclusively cognizable in equity, [the court could not] say that the trial court erred in failing to
transfer the case [to a court of equity]”); Cain v. Cross, 687 N.E.2d 1141, 1144 (Ill. App. Ct.
1997) (announcing that the distinctions between equitable and legal actions still apply and that the
chancery division of the circuit court had jurisdiction over equity cases); 423 S. Salina St., Inc. v.
City of Syracuse, 503 N.E.2d 63, 67 (N.Y. 1986) (recognizing and accepting the distinction
between law and equity); Buchanan v. Buchanan, 197 S.E. 426, 434 (Va. 1938) (holding the
distinctions between equitable and legal jurisdiction still exist and have not been modified to
allow an equitable remedy for a legal disposition).
127. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944); see also Camp v. Boyd, 229 U.S. 530,
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remedies may be invented or old ones modified in order to meet the
requirements of the case.128 If a judge decides she cannot grant a divorce
under the laws of her state or the laws of the marrying state, she still has
the authority to provide adequate relief to the couple before her. To
establish equity jurisdiction, the couple must demonstrate the following:
(1) there is no adequate remedy at law; (2) the couple will suffer real
harm; and (3) no equitable defenses preclude jurisdiction.129 The deci-
sion to grant equitable relief lies within the discretion of the court.130
The first requirement of equity jurisdiction will be met as soon as a
couple is denied their petition for dissolution under the divorce statutes
of either the residency state or the marrying state.”131 A decree of disso-
lution is the only way the couple can resolve uncertainty as to issues
such as financial planning, family relationships, and the ability to
remarry.132 Being denied access to the only sufficient and complete legal
remedy—a dissolution of their marriage—establishes the couple’s lack
of an adequate remedy at law.
The second requirement of equity jurisdiction is that the couple
must show that not being able to obtain a divorce creates irreparable
harm. The implications of denying access to judicial divorce are sub-
stantial. Same-sex married couples can demonstrate actual, substantial
harm by outlining the continuing limitations, uncertainties, and hard-
ships involved in being denied their ability to terminate their ongoing
obligations to one another due to their legal marital status.
Finally, for a court to exercise its equity jurisdiction, the couple
must demonstrate that no equitable defenses preclude jurisdiction. For
instance, the court, or a party opposing the divorce, could invoke the
maxim that “one who comes into equity must come with clean
551–52 (1913) (discussing the trial court’s ability to hear an entire case in equity, even if it
requires determination of legal rights, when justice so requires).
128. 27A AM JUR. 2D Equity, supra note 126, at § 77; see also Cannon v. Bingman, 383
S.W.2d 169, 174 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964) (discussing equity as elastic and not bound by rules that
will produce an inequitable result); Discover Bank v. Owens, 822 N.E.2d 869, 874 (Ohio Mun. Ct.
2004) (“The function of equity is to supplement the law where it is insufficient, moderating the
unjust results that would follow from the unbending application of the law.”).
129. Ne. Women’s Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 665 F. Supp. 1147, 1153 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (citing
11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§§ 2942–44 (1973)).
130. 27A AM. JUR. 2D Equity, supra note 126, at § 206.
131. To be deemed adequate, a legal remedy must be clear, certain, sufficient, complete, final,
and obtainable as of right. See id. at §§ 21, 29 (discussing the adequacy and certainty of a legal
remedy).
132. See Brief for Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Appellant, Alons v. Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, 698 N.W.2d 858 (Iowa
2005) (No. 03-1982), 2004 WL 4912312, at *22 [hereinafter Alons Amicus Brief].
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hands.”133 One might argue that if a same-sex couple knowingly leaves
the couple’s state of residence to gain access to legal marriage in another
state, the parties have unclean hands, under the view that the couple’s
behavior was dishonest or executed in bad faith and that the couple
should therefore be denied equitable relief.134 Many couples, however,
be they same-sex or opposite-sex, travel to other states to get married.
Typically, couples are not condemned for their “destination weddings,”
nor are such weddings considered fraudulent.135 When same-sex couples
travel out of their home state to marry, they have the added incentive to
celebrate their union in a state that will legally recognize it. They do not
do so to be evasive, dishonest, or fraudulent. Just as importantly, most
couples contemplating marriage believe they are going to stay together.
To suggest that same-sex couples marry in another state in an effort to
later take advantage of the court system in their home state to dissolve
that marriage would be an unusual argument indeed.
Once a couple has established the three requirements of equity
jurisdiction, a court has broad discretion to grant relief.136 The court’s
primary concern is providing a remedy that meets the necessities of the
particular situation so “that justice may be done.”137 When it comes to
133. DOBBS, supra note 54, at § 2.4(2); see also 27A AM. JUR. 2D Equity, supra note 126, § 92
(providing additional maxims: “(1) equity will not intrude to relieve party from the foreseeable
consequences of a conscious course of action; (2) equity will not assist in extricating a party from
his or her own wrongful and fraudulent conduct; (3) equity cannot be invoked when its aid
becomes necessary through a party’s own fault; (4) equity will not aid a volunteer; (5) a person
must be just before being generous; (6) equity cannot aid the violator of an oath; and (7) equity
will not allow a party to change horses in midstream. It is also said that equity cannot be invoked
for selfish or ulterior purposes” (footnotes omitted)). Because equity jurisdiction provides such
wide discretion to the courts, the purpose of these maxims is to ensure that the principles of equity
are upheld. See id. § 98 (explaining the purpose of the maxims on courts).
134. See DOBBS, supra note 54, at § 2.4(2).
135. It may, however, be considered evasive, and some jurisdictions have statutes that
explicitly prohibit the state from recognizing such marriages. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 765.04
(2009) (“If any person residing and intending to continue to reside in this state who is disabled or
prohibited from contracting marriage under the laws of this state goes into another state or country
and there contracts a marriage prohibited or declared void under the laws of this state, such
marriage shall be void for all purposes in this state with the same effect as though it had been
entered into in this state.”). But see Westerman v. Westerman, 247 P. 863, 865 (Kan. 1926)
(holding that a district court had jurisdiction to annul marriages “both by statute . . . and by virtue
of [its] general equity jurisdiction” and that jurisdiction included the adjudication of whether an
evasive marriage is valid or void in an annulment suit (citations omitted)).
136. DOBBS, supra note 54, at § 2.4(1). Statutes attempting to strip a court of equity R
jurisdiction rarely succeed. See, e.g., Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944) (“We cannot
but think that if Congress had intended to make such a drastic departure from the traditions of
equity practice, an unequivocal statement of its purpose would have been made.”).
137. 27A AM. JUR. 2D Equity, supra note 126, at § 206 (footnote omitted). “The trial court is
authorized in equity proceedings to mold its judgment so as to adjust the equities of all parties and
meet the obvious necessities of each situation.” Id. (footnote omitted); see also Valley Forge Ins.
Co./CNA Ins. Co. v. Strickland, 620 So. 2d 535, 541 (Miss. 1993) (“‘Equity jurisdiction permits
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MIA\67-1\MIA101.txt unknown Seq: 32 31-OCT-12 8:50
32 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:1
same-sex divorce, the judge has before her at least one state resident
who wishes to dissolve her legal obligations pursuant to her legal mar-
riage. To provide a remedy, a judge need not determine whether the
marriage is valid or void, or whether granting a divorce recognizes a
marriage or extends benefits of marriage.138 The judge simply needs to
acknowledge that the parties are in need of a judicial remedy that is
otherwise unavailable at law.139
Several courts have already provided this remedy. For example, in
Minnesota, a judge issued a declaratory judgment providing that two
married women were “single individuals, with all rights of an unmarried
individual, and [were] free and clear of any continuing obligation to
each other deriving from their marriage . . . .”140 Similarly, an Iowa
judge used equitable powers to enter an amended decree terminating a
Vermont civil union and ratifying the parties’ property settlement.141
Although equitable relief in the form of a declaratory judgment
may appear to be the path of least resistance—as opposed to asking a
court to apply either its divorce statutes or those of the marrying state—
a declaratory judgment is arguably the least favorable remedy. Only a
divorce decree issued by a court of law is sure to terminate the couple’s
marriage. As of the writing of this Article, it is unclear whether a state
would accept a declaratory judgment from another state as a full and
complete termination of a marriage.
If a same-sex couple pursues a declaratory judgment to terminate
their marriage, careful thought should be given to the specific language
requested in the judgment. For example, obtaining a judgment that
declares the marriage “terminated” or “dissolved” may prove a more
satisfactory remedy than one that merely declares the parties to be “sin-
gle individuals.” A declaratory judgment that uses the magic word
“divorce” and other language typically found in the state’s standard
divorce decree may be the best possible scenario for this less-than-ideal
remedy. Still, while the subsequent enforceability of these declaratory
judgments is unknown, this pathway may prove adequate for married
same-sex couples who are unable to get purely legal relief, but who are
seeking to move on with their lives.
Once a court acknowledges that it has subject-matter jurisdiction
over same-sex divorce petitions and that such petitions are valid claims
innovation that justice may be done. That there is no precedent for the exact relief sought is of no
consequence.’” (quoting Hall v. Wood, 443 So.2d 834, 842–43 (Miss. 1983))).
138. See Alons Amicus Brief, supra note 132, at *26–27 n.5.
139. See, e.g., Dickerson v. Thompson, 897 N.Y.S.2d 298, 301 (App. Div. 2010).
140. Glaser v. Grassman, No. 27-CV-10-16600, slip op. at 3 (Minn. Dist. Ct. July 22, 2010).
141. In re Marriage of Brown & Perez, No. CDCD119660, slip op. at 1–2 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Dec.
24, 2003).
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for which relief can be granted, petitioners can provide a judge with
three pathways for her to grant relief. A judge could apply the divorce
statutes of the parties’ state of residence or the divorce statutes of the
state that granted the marriage, or the court could provide equitable
relief in the form of a declaratory judgment. Although the arguments
supporting each pathway vary and the relief each provides is not identi-
cal, any one of the three should allow same-sex couples to obtain a judi-
cial termination of their marriages in almost every jurisdiction in the
United States.
V. SAME-SEX DIVORCE AS A CONSTITUTIONAL IMPERATIVE
We have demonstrated the undisputable need for same-sex divorce,
even for couples in states where their marriages are not legally recog-
nized. We have also shown that courts in forty-nine states have the
power to hear same-sex divorce cases and the power to grant relief to
same-sex couples seeking divorce. In this Part, we argue not that courts
could, or even should, grant same-sex divorces—but that they must.
Supreme Court precedent regarding substantive due process and equal
protection creates a constitutional imperative for courts to grant same-
sex divorce, thereby obligating state courts to do so.
A. The Due Process Trinity: The Fundamental Rights to Access the
Courts, Divorce, and Remarry
When a court refuses to hear a petition for same-sex divorce, it
implicates several rights of the petitioners. First, the parties’ right to
access the courts is affected because legal marriage can be granted only
by the state, and ending a legal marriage can be done only through state-
sanctioned judicial action. Second, denying same-sex couples access to
the courts to terminate their marriages denies the couples any right to
divorce that may exist. Though some argue that the Supreme Court has
yet to recognize an explicit fundamental right to divorce, the Court has
been clear that married couples have a right to access the courts to
obtain a divorce.142 Finally, preventing married couples from divorcing
infringes upon their fundamental right to marry because an individual is
required to obtain a divorce before marrying again. The unique interde-
pendence of these three rights—the right to access the courts, the right
to divorce, and the right to remarry—can be observed in the Supreme
Court case of Boddie v. Connecticut.143 This same trinity is implicated in
142. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374, 382–83 (1971) (“[D]ue process does
prohibit a State from denying, solely because of inability to pay, access to its courts to individuals
who seek judicial dissolution of their marriages.”).
143. Id. at 371.
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same-sex divorce cases.
In the landmark case of Boddie v. Connecticut, an indigent couple
was denied access to divorce because they could not pay the filing
fee.144 The Supreme Court struck down the filing fee on due process
grounds, holding that it was unconstitutional to deprive the couple of a
remedy that affects a fundamental right that is available solely through
the courts.145 In coming to that conclusion, the Court implicitly recog-
nized an interdependent trinity of fundamental rights: the right to access
the courts, the right to divorce, and the right to remarry. Each of these
rights is deduced from the other, and an offense against one of the rights
operates as an offense against the other two.146 To illustrate, suppose a
married couple wants to end their legal marriage. To do so, the couple
must obtain access to the court. If a court denies the couple access, the
couple cannot get divorced and must remain married. Similarly, if a
court allows the couple to access the court, but then refuses to allow
them access to divorce, again the couple must remain married. As such,
denying a married couple access to the court in order to obtain a divorce
forces them to stay married, which ultimately infringes their fundamen-
tal right to marry again. Each right in the trinity—the right to access the
courts, the right to divorce, and the right to remarry—was addressed by
the Court in Boddie.147 The Court reasoned that appearing before a judge
to seek a dissolution “is the exclusive precondition to the adjustment of
a fundamental human relationship” and that a state runs afoul of the Due
Process Clause when it “pre-empt[s] the right to dissolve this legal rela-
tionship without affording all citizens access to the means it has pre-
scribed for doing so.”148
For the Boddie Court, perhaps the most important right of the trin-
ity is the fundamental right to marry. In securing the couple’s access to
the courts to obtain a divorce, the Court’s view was decidedly prospec-
tive. The Court focused less on the fact that a divorce would end the
current marriage and more on the fact that a divorce would allow for a
future marriage.149 In other words, the Court recognized that the right of
access to the courts and the right to divorce must be protected in order to
144. Id. at 372.
145. Id. at 374–76.
146. See id. at 376. For example, a judge who denies access to the court to a married couple
prevents the couple from obtaining a divorce, which then prevents either member of the couple
from marrying again in the future. Similarly, a judge who allows access to the court, but refuses to
grant a divorce, also prevents the parties from marrying again in the future. A judge who denies
the right to remarry renders moot the right to access the courts or seek divorce.
147. Id. at 376.
148. Id. at 383.
149. Id. at 376 (“Even where all substantive requirements are concededly met, we know of no
instance where two consenting adults may divorce and mutually liberate themselves from the
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protect the individual’s right to remarry. A judge who denies a same-sex
divorce destroys this elegant structure of interlocking rights.
Because Boddie focused on the next marriage and not the current
one, the trinity of rights protected in Boddie is not dependent on whether
there is a fundamental right to same-sex marriage.150 In other words, just
because the Boddie appellants were in an opposite-sex marriage does not
mean the right to divorce is reserved for opposite-sex couples. Instead,
the right to marry implicitly entails a right to remarry that is not limited
to persons currently in opposite-sex marriages.151 The right to divorce
established in Boddie is not only about ending the current marriage, but
about enabling the parties to marry again in the future. Some individuals
seeking same-sex divorce may intend to remarry a person of the oppo-
site sex, which is exactly the right Boddie protects.
Supreme Court precedent has established a fundamental right to
constraints of legal obligations that go with marriage, and more fundamentally the prohibition
against remarriage, without invoking the State’s judicial machinery.”).
150. Some courts have held the fundamental right to marry is only recognized as a right to an
opposite-sex marriage. See, e.g., Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 333 (D.C. 1995)
(“Thus, in recognizing a fundamental right to marry, the Court has only contemplated marriages
between persons of opposite sexes . . .”); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971)
(“The institution of marriage as a union of man and woman, uniquely involving the procreation
and rearing of children within a family, is as old as the book of Genesis.”). However, other courts
have abandoned the notion that opposite-sex marriage is substantively different than same-sex
marriage for the purposes of a Due Process Clause analysis. See, e.g., Perry v. Schwarzenegger,
704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 993 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Perry v. Brown 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir.
2012).
151. The fundamental rights of marriage and divorce are separate legal issues and should
receive separate, discrete analyses. While parties voluntarily pursue marriage obligations largely
free of judicial interference, freeing themselves of those obligations through divorce is impossible
without the intervention of the courts. Boddie, 401 U.S. at 376. Consequently, it is simply not
sound legal analysis to read an opposite-sex dimension into divorce rights based on earlier
decisions where courts have detected an opposite-sex dimension in marriage rights. The Texas
Court of Appeals provides a striking example of the erroneous linking between marriage and
divorce rights. In In re Marriage of J.B. & H.B., the Texas Court of Appeals commented that “[a]
petition for divorce is a claim . . . to legal protections, benefits, or responsibilities ‘asserted as a
result of a marriage’” and concluded that it is therefore prohibited by Texas’s DoMA. In re
Marriage of J.B. & H.B., 326 S.W.3d 654, 665 (Tex. App. 2010) (quoting TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 6.204(c)(2) (West 2011). In analyzing whether the Texas statute violates the Equal Protection
Clause, the court concluded that Loving v. Virginia sanctions a fundamental right to marry a
person of the opposite sex and not a fundamental right to marry anyone of the litigant’s choosing.
See id. at 675–76 (explaining that Loving “does not embrace the broad formulation” that there is a
“right to marry a person of the same sex” (citations omitted)). Thus, the court found that the
parties were not seeking to avail themselves of a fundamental right and upheld the Texas statute
under a rational basis review. See id. at 676–81. The court did not address—in spite of its reading
of Loving—whether Boddie created an independent fundamental right to divorce. Instead, the
court concluded, without citation to any authority, that divorce is concomitant with marriage and
the recognition of a same-sex divorce insinuates recognition of a same-sex marriage. See id. at
675. The better approach would have been to analyze the right to divorce in relation to how
denying the dissolution petition would restrain the petitioners’ paths to marry in the future. See
Boddie, 401 U.S. at 376.
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marry.152 For any person in a legal marriage, exercising his or her right
to remarry includes access to the court to obtain a divorce. As such,
denying same sex-couples access to divorce infringes both the right to
divorce and the right to remarry. This state courts cannot do.
B. Equal Protection: An Animus-Based Analysis
Denial of a same-sex divorce not only violates due process, but also
constitutes unconstitutional discrimination. The Equal Protection Clause
requires states to treat similarly situated individuals alike. When it
comes to the need for divorce, opposite-sex and same-sex couples are
similarly situated—both want to terminate the obligations of a legal
marriage and to be free to exercise their fundamental right to remarry.
As such, denying same-sex couples access to divorce is constitutional
only if it passes equal protection review.
The proper standard of equal protection review to apply to a denial
of same-sex divorce is a matter of debate. It is arguable that such denials
would be subject to the highest standard of review—strict scrutiny—
because they implicate the denial of the fundamental right to marry.
Others may argue that this situation only implicates same-sex couples’
access to divorce, and divorce is not a fundamental right. Although we
disagree with both prongs of this argument, we are willing, for the
moment, to accept this assertion. As such, if denying same-sex couples
access to divorce does not implicate a fundamental right, it would con-
stitute discrimination based on sexual orientation and, presumably,
would be subject to a standard of review less than strict scrutiny.
The scrutiny applied to classifications based on sexual orientation
is not settled. Historically, most federal courts have applied rational
basis review to laws that discriminate based on sexual orientation.153
The Supreme Court suggested it was applying rational basis review in
two discrimination cases involving sexual orientation, but in striking
down both laws the Court did not enlist the outright deference to govern-
mental prerogatives typically seen under rational basis review.154
Recently courts have held, and the Executive Branch has argued, that a
more heightened standard of review for sexual orientation is warranted.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of California
in Perry v. Schwarzenegger, in striking down an amendment to the Cali-
fornia constitution prohibiting gay marriage, stated that “gays and lesbi-
152. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383–88 (1978).
153. See, e.g., Citizens for Equal Prot. v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859, 863, 866 (8th Cir. 2006)
(applying rational basis review to an amendment of the state constitution that limited marriage to
opposite-sex couples).
154. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996).
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ans are the type of minority strict scrutiny was designed to protect.”155
In addition, United States Attorney General Eric Holder announced that
classifications based on sexual orientation merit heightened scrutiny and
that the Department of Justice will no longer defend equal protection
claims brought against the federal DoMA.156
Although the law’s trajectory is bending toward heightened scru-
tiny for discrimination based on sexual orientation, the denial of divorce
to same-sex couples fails even rational basis review because there is no
legitimate reason for the denial. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held
that governmental actions driven by animus alone lack a legitimate pur-
pose and will not survive even rational basis review. In 1973, in United
States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, the Court struck down a
statute denying food stamps to hippies.157 In holding that the law failed
rational basis review, the Court observed that “if the constitutional con-
ception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything, it must at the
very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically
unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate government interest.”158
Twelve years later, the Court put a finer point on its Moreno holding in
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. when it applied rational
basis and struck down a municipal zoning law that would have prohib-
ited the opening of a home for persons with cognitive disabilities.159 The
Court noted that although “‘[p]rivate biases may be outside the reach of
the law . . . the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.’”160
In 1996, the Court struck down a facially discriminatory law
targeted specifically at gays and lesbians under rational basis review.161
In Romer v. Evans, the Court struck down an amendment to the Colo-
rado Constitution that banned all state laws providing protection from
discrimination to gays and lesbians.162 Justice Kennedy, writing for the
155. 704 F. Supp. 2d at 997 (citing Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976)). In
its final analysis, however, the district court in Perry applied a rational basis review, holding that
the amendment failed even this most forgiving standard. Id. at 1003.
156. Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. Att’y Gen., to John A. Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House
of Representatives (Feb. 23, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-
ag-223.html [hereinafter Holder] (“After careful consideration, including a review of my
recommendation, the President has concluded that given a number of factors, including a
documented history of discrimination, classifications based on sexual orientation should be
subject to a heightened standard of scrutiny.”).
157. 413 U.S. 528, 529, 534, 538 (1973).
158. Id. at 534.
159. 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985) (“[M]ere negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors
which are properly cognizable in a zoning proceeding, are not permissible bases for treating a
home for the mentally retarded differently [from other multiple-tenant dwellings].”).
160. Id. (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984)).
161. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996).
162. Id. at 624.
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majority, observed that the “sheer breadth [of the amendment] is so dis-
continuous with the reasons offered for it that the amendment seems
inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects; it lacks a
rational relationship to legitimate state interests.”163
Denying same-sex couples divorce is equally broad. A complete
ban, in fact, can be no broader. Moreover, no legitimate reason has been
offered for the denial. As previously discussed, the social policy sup-
porting marriage that led to state DoMAs does not support a ban on
same-sex divorce. The only remaining reason for banning same-sex
divorce, then, is animus. Indeed, in announcing that the Obama Admin-
istration would no longer defend the federal DoMA, Attorney General
Holder noted that the legislative history of the federal DoMA was lit-
tered with signs that its passage was driven by animus against gays and
lesbians.164 State DoMAs directly follow from the federal DoMA and
are based on this same illegitimate rationale.
While gay marriage opponents are struggling to put forth legitimate
arguments supporting a ban on gay marriage, there can be no explana-
tion, other than animus, for a ban on same-sex divorce. No rational basis
can exist for a legislative policy so disapproving of gay marriage that it
forces same-sex couples to remain married. Only animus could explain
such a law, and judges, who are charged with implementing the legisla-
ture’s divorce scheme, become the means by which states violate the
Equal Protection Clause by denying same-sex divorce.165 This judges
may not do.
VI. CONCLUSION
A judge holds tremendous power in ordering the relationships
between married persons. For an opposite-sex couple seeking a divorce,
the judge’s role is almost pro forma. Once the couple petitions the court
for a divorce, the divorce is granted as a matter of course. This makes
sense: No state interest is benefited by binding a loveless couple
together by judicial fiat. Not only would such an arrangement signal
governmental abdication, it offends the most basic sense of right and
wrong. Yet many judges, using tortured readings of their states’
DoMAs, lock same-sex couples together, depriving them of any way to
obtain a means to legally end their relationship. This outcome flies in the
163. Id. at 632.
164. Holder, supra note 156.
165. The typical marital dissolution statute assigns to the judiciary the job of executing the
legislature’s intent regarding divorce. In essence, the legislature has assigned control over divorce
proceedings to the courts, and a judge is the only governmental actor standing between marriage
and divorce. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376 (1971).
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face of a well-established line of constitutional protections embraced by
the Supreme Court. The Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses obli-
gate judges to provide the remedy of divorce to same-sex couples. In
addition, in the vast majority of states, nothing in their state DoMA
strips from the court the power to hear a petition for divorce from a
same-sex couple or prevents a court from granting such relief. As a
result, although same-sex couples can marry in only a handful of states,
they can divorce in forty-nine. For same-sex couples, it seems, first
comes divorce, and then comes marriage.
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